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Keywords

appealtrialhabeas corpusdue process
appealhearingtrialhabeas corpusconstitutional lawdue process

Related Cases

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457, 64 USLW 4531, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4426, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7217

Facts

Richard McClelland was murdered by the petitioner and his accomplice after they forced him into their car and robbed him. Following the robbery, the petitioner shot McClelland in the back of the head and attempted to destroy evidence by burning his car. During the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence linking the petitioner to another double murder, which he claimed he was not adequately prepared to defend against due to insufficient notice of the evidence. After exhausting state remedies, the petitioner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that he was denied due process.

At the start of petitioner's Virginia trial for the capital murder of Richard McClelland, the prosecution acknowledged that, should the trial reach the penalty phase, it would introduce petitioner's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered Lisa Sorrell and her daughter.

Issue

Did the Commonwealth violate the petitioner's due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice of the evidence it intended to use against him at the penalty phase of his trial?

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder, complains that his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because he was not given adequate notice of some of the evidence the Commonwealth intended to use against him at the penalty hearing of his trial.

Rule

A claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts entitling a petitioner to relief. Procedural default occurs when a claim is not raised in state court, barring federal habeas review unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default.

In Virginia, '[n]o writ [of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum] shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition.'

Analysis

The court determined that the petitioner's Brady claim was procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it in state court, and Virginia law precludes review of defaulted claims in future state habeas proceedings. The notice-of-evidence claim was found to require a new constitutional rule, which could not be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane. The court also noted that the petitioner had not demonstrated that he was denied a fair opportunity to address the evidence presented against him.

Petitioner's failure to raise his Brady claim in state court implicates the requirements in habeas of exhaustion and procedural default.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, affirming that the petitioner's claims were not cognizable in federal court due to procedural default.

Vacated and remanded.

Who won?

The Commonwealth prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court upheld the procedural default ruling, preventing the petitioner from obtaining federal habeas relief.

The Commonwealth appealed, arguing to the Fourth Circuit that to grant petitioner habeas relief would give him the benefit of a new rule of federal constitutional law, in violation of Teague v. Lane.

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