Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

defendanttrialcircumstantial evidencerelevanceadmissibilitycredibility
defendantattorneytrialtestimonycircumstantial evidenceprosecutorobjectionhearsaycredibilitydeliberation

Related Cases

People v. Fett, 257 Mich.App. 76, 666 N.W.2d 676
View Case »
Dunton v. Suffolk County, State of N.Y., 729 F.2d 903
View Case »
Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 9 A.L.R.4th 181
View Case »
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 601, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,887
View Case »
U.S. v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 54 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 335, 00 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5530, 2000 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7377
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1

Facts

Defendant was charged with murdering his wife, Karen Green, on October 11, 1977. Their marriage was troubled, and on the morning of the murder, Karen expressed her intention to leave him. After a series of events involving the defendant's attempts to locate Karen, he picked her up with the help of an acquaintance, David Khan. They drove to a secluded area where the defendant shot Karen. The prosecution's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the defendant's own admissions following the crime.

Issue

Did the trial court err in its evidentiary rulings and in denying the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel?

The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that witness was afraid to go to prison because defendant 'had a lot of friends there'; (2) testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding their concern for their personal safety and of ensuing protective measures taken by authorities was relevant to issue of their credibility; (3) testimony that defendant asked witness to pick up methadrine and $800 in cash was relevant and admissible; (4) trial court did not err in rejecting testimony attempting to establish motive of another to commit crime of murder; (5) although victim's statement reporting defendant's threat to her life was nonhearsay and relevant, trial court erred in admitting such evidence without making explicit determination that risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value of evidence, but error did not result in miscarriage of justice; (6) where harm flowing from alleged prosecutorial misconduct could have been cured by appropriate admonition, defendant's claims of error were waived by failure to make timely objection; (7) prosecutor's remark did not result in miscarriage of justice; (8) trial court did not err in refusing instruction that absence of flight by suspect may be considered by jury as circumstantial evidence that he had innocent frame of mind; (9) instruction that jury may consider as evidence tending to prove consciousness of guilt any false or deliberately misleading statements that defendant made prior to trial concerning crimes charged against him was warranted; (10) trial court's error in failing to exercise its discretion to reopen case after deliberations had begun in order to receive additional testimony did not result in miscarriage of justice; (11) defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel by trial attorney's failure to move for change of venue; (12) evidence was sufficient to support conviction for robbery; (13) murder was not committed 'during the commission' of robbery so as to support finding that robbery was special circumstance elevating murder to capital offense; and (14) conviction for kidnapping constituted miscarriage of justice and could not be used for finding of special circumstances.

Rule

The court applied rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, particularly concerning relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect, as well as standards for determining effective assistance of counsel.

The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that: (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that witness was afraid to go to prison because defendant 'had a lot of friends there'; (2) testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding their concern for their personal safety and of ensuing protective measures taken by authorities was relevant to issue of their credibility; (3) testimony that defendant asked witness to pick up methadrine and $800 in cash was relevant and admissible; (4) trial court did not err in rejecting testimony attempting to establish motive of another to commit crime of murder; (5) although victim's statement reporting defendant's threat to her life was nonhearsay and relevant, trial court erred in admitting such evidence without making explicit determination that risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value of evidence, but error did not result in miscarriage of justice; (6) where harm flowing from alleged prosecutorial misconduct could have been cured by appropriate admonition, defendant's claims of error were waived by failure to make timely objection; (7) prosecutor's remark did not result in miscarriage of justice; (8) trial court did not err in refusing instruction that absence of flight by suspect may be considered by jury as circumstantial evidence that he had innocent frame of mind; (9) instruction that jury may consider as evidence tending to prove consciousness of guilt any false or deliberately misleading statements that defendant made prior to trial concerning crimes charged against him was warranted; (10) trial court's error in failing to exercise its discretion to reopen case after deliberations had begun in order to receive additional testimony did not result in miscarriage of justice; (11) defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel by trial attorney's failure to move for change of venue; (12) evidence was sufficient to support conviction for robbery; (13) murder was not committed 'during the commission' of robbery so as to support finding that robbery was special circumstance elevating murder to capital offense; and (14) conviction for kidnapping constituted miscarriage of justice and could not be used for finding of special circumstances.

Analysis

The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain testimonies that were relevant to the credibility of witnesses and the defendant's motive. Although some evidence was admitted without proper balancing of its prejudicial effect, the court concluded that these errors did not affect the overall outcome of the trial. The evidence presented was sufficient to support the convictions for murder and robbery.

The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain testimonies that were relevant to the credibility of witnesses and the defendant's motive. Although some evidence was admitted without proper balancing of its prejudicial effect, the court concluded that these errors did not affect the overall outcome of the trial. The evidence presented was sufficient to support the convictions for murder and robbery.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions for first-degree murder and robbery but reversed the kidnapping conviction, stating that the findings of special circumstances elevating the murder to a capital offense must be set aside.

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions for first-degree murder and robbery but reversed the kidnapping conviction, stating that the findings of special circumstances elevating the murder to a capital offense must be set aside.

Who won?

The People (State) prevailed in the case as the court upheld the convictions for murder and robbery, finding sufficient evidence to support these charges.

You must be