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Keywords

defendantattorneyappealtrialhabeas corpusvoir dire
defendantattorneytrialcivil procedure

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Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 116 Cal.Rptr. 713

Facts

The petitioner, an attorney, was representing a defendant charged with multiple counts of murder. Between August and November 1972, he engaged in conduct deemed contemptuous by the court, including advising his client to disobey a lawful order and making prejudicial comments during voir dire. The court had issued multiple warnings regarding his behavior, which ultimately led to contempt charges and sentences totaling 54 days in jail and fines of $3,200.

The conduct found to be contemptuous occurred in the immediate view and presence of the court between August 14, 1972, and November 10, 1972, during the period petitioner was representing a defendant in a criminal case wherein the defendant was charged with 25 counts of murder.

Issue

Did the attorney's conduct during the trial constitute contempt of court, and were the contempt judgments justified given the warnings issued by the court?

The power of the court to punish summarily for a direct contempt is contained in Code of Civil Procedure, section 1211, which provides: ‘When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court . . . it may be punished summarily; for which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as therein prescribed.'

Rule

An attorney may be held in contempt for advising a client to disobey a lawful court order and for making prejudicial comments during trial proceedings, especially after being warned by the court to refrain from such conduct.

An attorney who advises his client to violate a lawful order of the court may be held in contempt (Ex parte Vance (1891) 88 Cal. 281, 282—283, 26 P. 118; McFarland v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 407, 423, 228 P. 1033).

Analysis

The court reviewed the attorney's actions in light of the established rules of professional conduct and the specific warnings given. It found that the attorney's repeated interjections and advice to his client to disregard court orders were clear violations of his duties as an officer of the court. The court emphasized that the attorney's persistence in making prejudicial comments, despite admonishments, constituted contempt.

The court found that the contemner's references to the appearance of the psychologist at no cost to the defendant and to the psychologist's belief in the defendant's innocence constituted improper and prejudicial attempts to influence prospective jurors in violation of the professional ethics of contemner as an attorney at law, and an improper interference with the administration of justice and the trial of the case.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus in part, annulling certain contempt judgments while sustaining others, affirming the court's authority to maintain order and respect in judicial proceedings.

The judgment of contempt of court issued nunc pro tunc September 20, 1972, states that following the examination of a prospective juror, and after the prosecution had peremptorily challenged another prospective juror, and after repeated admonishments not to attempt to influence prospective jurors by the interjection of prejudicial comments into the jury selection proceedings, petitioner made the following statement: ‘Your Honor, for the record, I want to say that they passed that woman one time and now they exercise their peremptory challenge; and to me that's an act of absolute white racism.'

Who won?

The petitioner prevailed in part, as some contempt judgments were annulled due to insufficient evidence or lack of prior warnings.

The court found that the contemner's references to white racism and systematic exclusion of minority groups from the jury constituted improper and prejudicial attempts to influence jurors, a violation of the professional ethics of contemner as an attorney at law, and an improper interference with the administration of justice and the trial of the case.

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