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Keywords

lawsuitsettlementattorneymotiondiscrimination
settlementattorneydiscrimination

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Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590

Facts

In November 1998, Brenda Makins filed a lawsuit against the District of Columbia for sex discrimination and retaliatory firing after being discharged from her job in 1997. During a court-ordered settlement conference in 2000, her attorney negotiated a settlement of $99,000 without her presence. Although the attorney claimed to have communicated with Makins during the conference, she later refused to sign the settlement agreement, prompting the District to file a motion to enforce the settlement.

In November 1998, Brenda Makins, represented by John Harrison, Esquire, brought an action against the District of Columbia in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming sex discrimination and retaliatory firing, in violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.).

Issue

Is a client bound by a settlement agreement negotiated by her attorney when the client has not given the attorney actual authority to settle the case but has authorized the attorney to attend a settlement conference and negotiate on her behalf?

Under District of Columbia law, is a client bound by a settlement agreement negotiated by her attorney when the client has not given the attorney actual authority to settle the case on those terms but has authorized the attorney to attend a settlement conference before a magistrate judge and to negotiate on her behalf and when the attorney leads the opposing party to believe that the client has agreed to those terms.

Rule

Under District of Columbia law, a client is not bound by a settlement agreement unless the attorney has actual authority to settle or there are sufficient manifestations from the client to support a finding of apparent authority.

In the District of Columbia the decision to settle belongs to the client, see D.C. Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.2(a) (2004), a fact confirmed by our decisions.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether Makins had given her attorney sufficient authority to bind her to the settlement. It concluded that merely sending the attorney to the settlement conference and allowing him to negotiate did not constitute a manifestation of authority that would lead a reasonable third party to believe the attorney had the authority to finalize the settlement. The court emphasized that the decision to settle ultimately belongs to the client, and without further indications from Makins, the attorney's actions were insufficient to establish apparent authority.

We hold, however, that absent further manifestations by Makins—not Harrison—which are not contained in the certified question, there was insufficient conduct by the client to support a reasonable belief by the District that Harrison had full and final authority to agree to the settlement terms.

Conclusion

The court answered the certified question in the negative, ruling that Makins was not bound by the settlement agreement negotiated by her attorney due to a lack of apparent authority.

We answer the certified question in the negative.

Who won?

Brenda Makins prevailed in the case because the court found that her attorney did not have the authority to bind her to the settlement agreement.

The District also presents several policy arguments supporting enforcement of settlement agreements on apparent authority grounds, none of which we find compelling.

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