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New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. D.C., 118 N.J. 388, 571 A.2d 1295

Facts

In 1975, the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) filed a complaint against D.C. and M.C. for child abuse and neglect, leading to the appointment of attorneys to represent them. After a lengthy trial, the court terminated the parental rights of D.C. and M.C. regarding one child. The appointed attorneys subsequently sought to compel the Public Advocate or Attorney General to pay their fees, but the trial court found no statutory basis for such payment, leading to an appeal and subsequent affirmations of the lower court's rulings.

In 1975 DYFS filed a protective-services complaint under N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21 to –8.73 and N.J.S.A. 30:4C–12 against D.C. and M.C., the parents of three minors.

Issue

Whether attorneys appointed to represent indigent parents in termination of parental rights proceedings are entitled to compensation for their services.

The two terms have different implications. The fees are 'compensable' if appellants have the substantive right to be paid. They are 'legally payable,' however, only if the legislature has appropriated funds to pay appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions or if this Court has the constitutional authority to compel the State to pay them.

Rule

The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that there is no statutory authorization for the payment of fees for appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions, and that the judiciary cannot compel the legislature to appropriate funds for such payments.

We find no statutory authorization for the compensation of appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory framework governing Title 30 and Title 9 actions, noting that while Title 9 provides for compensation for appointed counsel, Title 30 does not include any such provisions. The court emphasized that the absence of statutory authorization for payment in Title 30 actions indicates the legislature's intent not to compensate appointed attorneys in these cases. Furthermore, the court found that the distinctions made by the legislature between the two titles were rational and did not violate equal protection or due process.

The court did not believe that the similarities between the duties of Title 9 and Title 30 attorneys override the distinction made by the legislature between these statutory schemes.

Conclusion

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions are not entitled to compensation due to the lack of statutory authorization.

We find no basis on which to order payment of the costs incurred by the appellants in the underlying Title 30 action.

Who won?

The State prevailed in this case as the court affirmed the decision denying compensation to the appointed attorneys, citing the absence of statutory authorization for such payments.

The Appellate Division held that the fees are neither compensable nor payable.

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