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Keywords

defendantattorneytrustantitrust
defendantlitigationattorneymotiontrustwillantitrust

Related Cases

Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 10 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1601, 10 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1606

Facts

Nick C. Spanos, a California attorney, was engaged to assist in an antitrust suit in New York federal court. Although he worked extensively on the case from 1953 to 1958, he never applied for admission to the New York bar. After being discharged by the defendants, Spanos sought to recover fees for his services, leading to a legal dispute over his right to compensation given his unlicensed status in New York.

Spanos graduated from law school in 1947, having written a research paper about the movie industry and the antitrust laws. After a year in New York working in the motion picture antitrust field, he went to California where on January 4, 1949 he became a member of the California bar and commenced practice.

Issue

Can an out-of-state attorney recover for legal services rendered in an antitrust suit in a New York federal court when he has not been admitted to the bar of New York State or of the federal court?

The principal question for decision is whether an out-of-state attorney can recover for legal services rendered in an antitrust suit in a New York federal court when he has not been admitted to the bar of New York State or of the federal court.

Rule

New York law prohibits the practice of law by individuals not licensed to practice in the state, but federal law allows for the admission of attorneys from other states to practice in federal courts under certain conditions.

New York implements its strong policy against the practice of law in New York by persons not licensed and admitted to practice by the state, New York Penal Code McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 270, by refusing to permit suit for the recovery of fees for such unlawful practice.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether Spanos' activities constituted the practice of law under New York law. It concluded that while Spanos had not been admitted to the New York bar, his work was related to federal antitrust law and thus should be governed by federal standards. The court found that Spanos could have applied for admission pro hac vice, and his failure to do so did not preclude recovery since there was no indication that such an application would have been denied.

The court agreed with Judge Wyatt that it is within the power of the federal government to determine who will be permitted to practice in its courts and that this includes allowing compensation for services rendered in regard to litigation in the federal courts.

Conclusion

The court reversed the lower court's award of fees to Spanos but affirmed the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim for the return of previously paid fees. The complaint was dismissed, and the court held that Spanos could not recover for his services.

The judgment of the district court is reversed insofar as it awarded Spanos $89,606.29 and affirmed insofar as it dismissed the counterclaim of the defendants.

Who won?

The defendants prevailed in the case as the court reversed the award of fees to Spanos, concluding that he could not recover for his services due to his failure to apply for admission pro hac vice.

The judgment of the district court is reversed insofar as it awarded Spanos $89,606.29 and affirmed insofar as it dismissed the counterclaim of the defendants.

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