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Keywords

tortplaintiffdamagesattorneydiscoverynegligencetrialpleamalpracticelegal malpracticedefense attorney
tortplaintiffdiscoverynegligencemalpracticelegal malpracticeappellant

Related Cases

Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577

Facts

In January 1989, Charles A. Trobaugh was charged with multiple offenses, and Patrick A. Sondag, who had previously signed the complaints against Trobaugh, became his defense attorney. Trobaugh accepted a plea agreement and was incarcerated for eleven months. Years later, after a federal conviction, Trobaugh reexamined his 1989 case and discovered Sondag's potential conflict of interest. After several attempts at postconviction relief, Trobaugh was granted a new trial in 2000, leading him to file a claim for damages against Sondag under the Iowa Tort Claims Act.

In January 1989, Charles A. Trobaugh (Trobaugh) was charged in Pottawattamie County with assault with intent to inflict serious injury, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm by a felon.

Issue

When does a plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice accrue under the Iowa Tort Claims Act in the context of alleged negligence during criminal representation?

Ultimately, we conclude that the appellant's claim accrued at the time he successfully achieved postconviction relief.

Rule

A claim for legal malpractice does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers the injury or should have discovered it through reasonable diligence, which in the context of criminal representation, requires relief from the underlying conviction.

Importantly, we have previously interpreted section 669.13 as encompassing the 'discovery rule,' under which 'a cause of action based on negligence does not accrue until a plaintiff discovers the injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.'

Analysis

The court determined that Trobaugh's claim for legal malpractice accrued when he was granted postconviction relief in November 2000, not when he first discovered the alleged malpractice in 1997. The court emphasized that requiring relief from a conviction before a malpractice claim can be filed preserves judicial economy and respects the postconviction process. This approach aligns with the discovery rule applied in negligence claims under the Iowa Tort Claims Act.

We thus also conclude that a claim for legal malpractice in the criminal case context is not discovered and does not accrue until relief from a conviction is achieved.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's dismissal of Trobaugh's claim, ruling that it was timely filed following his postconviction relief.

Thus, we reject Sondag's claim that Trobaugh's legal malpractice action is barred under an exception to the Tort Claims Act as the functional equivalent of causes of action for false imprisonment, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.

Who won?

Charles A. Trobaugh prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that his claim was timely based on the accrual rule established for legal malpractice claims in the context of criminal representation.

Trobaugh's claim was filed in a timely manner, contrary to the determination of the district court.

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