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Keywords

hearingtrustdue process

plaintiffhearingdue process

Related Cases

Urban v. Tularosa, 161 F.3d 19 (Table), 1998 WL 694465, 98 CJ C.A.R. 5232

Facts

Christopher Urban was hired as a police officer in June 1994 but did not complete the required training at the New Mexico Law Enforcement Academy until June 1996. His termination followed a political sign placed by his mother supporting a political opponent of a village trustee, Margie Trujillo. Urban was accused of misusing a village credit card, and after a council meeting where he was not present, he was terminated without proper notice or a hearing regarding the charges against him.

Plaintiff was hired as a village police officer in June 1994. Although state law requires a police officer to complete training at the New Mexico Law Enforcement Academy within a year of being hired, the village police department did not send plaintiff to the Academy until January 1996.

Issue

Did the village of Tularosa and its officials violate Christopher Urban's First Amendment rights and procedural due process rights when they terminated him without adequate notice or a hearing?

Rule

Public employees with a property interest in continued employment are entitled to notice of the charges against them, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present their side before termination, as established in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.

It is well established that due process requires that a public employee with a property interest in continued employment is entitled to 'oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story' before he is terminated.

Analysis

The court determined that Urban was not adequately informed that his job was in jeopardy due to the credit card misuse and that the February council meeting did not constitute a proper pretermination hearing. The court emphasized that Urban was not aware that the council was considering termination based on the credit card issue, and thus he did not receive the necessary notice or opportunity to respond.

However, according to the complaint, plaintiff never knew that his job was in jeopardy because of his mistaken credit card charges. Thus, when his credit card use was discussed, plaintiff did not know that the village council was considering termination based upon that ground.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the dismissal of Urban's First Amendment claim but reversed the dismissal of his procedural due process claim, remanding the case for further proceedings.

In summary, we conclude the district court's Rule 12(c) dismissal of plaintiff's procedural due process claim under § 1983 was erroneous, and that claim must be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, but we conclude that plaintiff's First Amendment claim under § 1983 was properly dismissed.

Who won?

The village of Tularosa prevailed on the First Amendment claim because Urban could not assert a claim based on his mother's political speech. However, the court's reversal on the procedural due process claim indicates that Urban may have a valid claim regarding his termination process.

However, as the district court recognized, the sign was his mother's political speech, not plaintiff's.

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