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Keywords

lawyerappealhearingrespondent

attorneylawyerappealhearingrespondent

Related Cases

In re Wilkins, 782 N.E.2d 985

Facts

The respondent sought rehearing after the Supreme Court's initial opinion found that certain remarks in his brief violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) and warranted a thirty-day suspension. The remarks suggested unethical motivations behind a Court of Appeals decision. The respondent later contacted judicial leaders to apologize for the inappropriate language and acknowledged that it should not have been included in the brief. The court considered the respondent's overall record of honesty and integrity in the legal profession.

As noted in our per curiam opinion, the respondent timely contacted the offices of both the Chief Judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Chief Justice of Indiana, and thereafter wrote to both the Chief Judge and the Chief Justice 'offering to apologize in person and to acknowledge that the footnote was ‘overly-aggressive and inappropriate and should never have made its way into our Brief.’'

Issue

Did the respondent's remarks in his brief violate Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a), and what is the appropriate sanction for this violation?

The respondent in this attorney discipline matter seeks rehearing following our per curiam opinion, Matter of Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714 (Ind.2002), which held that certain remarks in the respondent's brief supporting his petition for transfer in a prior case violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) and warranted his suspension from the practice of law for thirty days.

Rule

Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) states that a lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge.

Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) provides in relevant part: 'A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the … integrity of a judge….'

Analysis

The court determined that the respondent's remarks went beyond permissible advocacy and impugned the integrity of the judges involved. The specific language in the brief suggested bias and favoritism, which violated the standards set forth in Rule 8.2(a). However, upon reconsideration of the appropriate sanction, the court acknowledged the respondent's exemplary record and the fact that the offending language was not authored by him, leading to a reduction in the penalty.

The language of footnote 2 does not merely argue that the Court of Appeals decision is factually or legally inaccurate. Such would be permissible advocacy. The footnote goes further and ascribes bias and favoritism to the judges authoring and concurring in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, and it implies that these judges manufactured a false rationale in an attempt to justify their pre-conceived desired outcome.

Conclusion

The court concluded that the appropriate sanction for the respondent's violation of Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) should be a public reprimand rather than a thirty-day suspension.

Upon rehearing as to the sanction, we conclude that the respondent's penalty in this disciplinary proceeding should not consist of a period of suspension but rather only the public reprimand already effected by the content of our initial per curiam opinion.

Who won?

The respondent prevailed in part, as the court reduced the sanction from a thirty-day suspension to a public reprimand, recognizing his overall integrity and the context of the violation.

We grant rehearing in part, however, as to the particular issue of the appropriate sanction to be imposed for this violation.

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