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Keywords

plaintiffstatutediscriminationzoningcorporation
plaintiffstatutewilldiscrimination

Related Cases

Ace Tire Co., Inc. v. Municipal Officers of City of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90

Facts

The plaintiff corporation operated a junkyard located within 100 feet of a highway in Waterville, Maine, since 1926. The business was classified as a non-conforming use under the local zoning ordinance. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute that required a $500 permit fee for junkyards within 100 feet of a highway, arguing that it discriminated against their business compared to those located farther away, which only required a $10 fee. The plaintiff also sought reimbursement for the fees paid under protest in previous years.

The agreed statement discloses that the plaintiff's premises from which it operates its junkyard business are located at 2 Drummond Avenue in the City of Waterville and lie within one hundred feet from the highway.

Issue

Whether the statutory classification imposing a higher fee on junkyards located within 100 feet of a highway, compared to those located farther away, constitutes an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the law.

The issue is presented to us by way of report on an agreed statement of facts pursuant to Rule 72(b), M.R.C.P.

Rule

A statute must not be arbitrary or capricious and must have a real and substantial relation to its purpose. Discriminatory classifications must be justified by a legitimate governmental interest.

If a statute is within the legitimate range of the police power, has a fair tendency to accomplish the end proposed, is not unjustly discriminative, and does not destroy nor despoil a particular class, courts should not declare it unreasonable merely because they consider it impolitic or because it will operate harshly upon some individuals.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statute's purpose, which was to protect public safety by regulating junkyards near highways. However, it found that the significant difference in fees imposed on junkyards based on their proximity to highways bore no actual relation to the statute's intended purpose. The court concluded that the discrimination was unwarranted and arbitrary, favoring some operators over others without a rational basis.

The discrimination is unwarranted and arbitrary, the difference is illusory and in effect the statute unreasonably and without proper distinction favors some operators of junkyards over others.

Conclusion

The court declared the provision requiring a $500 fee for junkyards within 100 feet of a highway unconstitutional, while allowing the remainder of the statute to stand. The plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for the fees paid under protest.

The entry will be Section 2455B of Title 30 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated is hereby declared invalid and unconstitutional, only in so far as it requires the municipal officers to collect from the applicant for a junkyard permit ‘(f)ive hundred dollars for each permit for an automobile graveyard or junkyard located within 100 feet from any highway.’

Who won?

The plaintiff corporation prevailed in the case because the court found the statute's fee structure to be arbitrary and unconstitutional, thus validating their challenge.

The plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for the $500 license fee paid to the City of Waterville under protest for the respective years of 1968, 1969 and 1970, together with costs.

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