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Keywords

liabilitysummary judgmentvicarious liability
negligenceliabilitysummary judgment

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Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 73 P.3d 315, 468 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 4

Facts

Officer Michelle Ross was a Field Training Officer for the Salt Lake City Police Department. On the day of the accident, she was driving her marked patrol car home from a scheduled FTO meeting while off duty, with her infant son in the car. Although Ross was compensated for her time at the meeting, she was not paid for her commute or mileage. The city allowed officers to use patrol cars for commuting under a take-home program, but it was not mandatory. Ross had never been called to respond to an emergency while commuting outside Salt Lake County.

Ross was a Field Training Officer ('FTO') for the Salt Lake City Police Department in addition to her regular duties. At the time of the accident giving rise to this case, she was driving her marked patrol car home to Tooele County from an FTO meeting on an off-duty day. Ross had her infant son in the car with her while commuting from the regularly scheduled meeting.

Issue

Did Officer Ross act within the course and scope of her employment when she was involved in the accident while commuting home in a marked patrol car?

Did Officer Ross act within the course and scope of her employment when she was involved in the accident while commuting home in a marked patrol car?

Rule

The 'coming and going rule' generally states that an employee is not considered to be acting within the scope of employment while commuting to and from work, unless specific exceptions apply.

We have previously adopted the general rule that 'an employee is not in the scope of his employment for purposes of third-party negligence claims when he is traveling to and from work.'

Analysis

The court determined that the coming and going rule applied to Officer Ross's situation, as her commute was primarily personal in nature. Although the city received some benefit from her use of the patrol car, it was not sufficient to establish that her trip was within the scope of her employment. The court found that the Ahlstroms failed to demonstrate any unique circumstances or exceptions to the coming and going rule that would impose vicarious liability on the city.

The court determined that the coming and going rule applied to Officer Ross's situation, as her commute was primarily personal in nature. Although the city received some benefit from her use of the patrol car, it was not sufficient to establish that her trip was within the scope of her employment.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Ahlstroms, concluding that the coming and going rule barred vicarious liability against Salt Lake City.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of partial summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Salt Lake City prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the coming and going rule applied, and the Ahlstroms did not demonstrate any exceptions to this rule that would impose liability on the city.

Salt Lake City prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the coming and going rule applied, and the Ahlstroms did not demonstrate any exceptions to this rule that would impose liability on the city.

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