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Keywords

defendantinjunctiontrialwillappellant
defendantinjunctiontrialwillappellant

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Ault v. Shipley, 189 Va. 69, 52 S.E.2d 56

Facts

The appellants, owners of lots in the Virginia Heights development, filed for an injunction against the defendants, who owned a block within the same development. The defendants began constructing a shopping center despite existing building restrictions that prohibited such commercial use. The trial court initially granted a temporary injunction but later dismissed the case, citing changed conditions in the area. The appellants argued that they purchased their properties relying on the restrictions, which were intended to maintain the residential character of the development.

The appellants each own one or more lots in a real estate development in Bristol, known as Virginia Heights, and the defendant, Margaret V. Shipley, owns all of block 5, which includes lots 1 to 9, inclusive, in the same development.

Issue

Whether the building restrictions in the deeds of the Virginia Heights development should be enforced against the defendants, who sought to construct a shopping center despite those restrictions.

The question to be determined is whether or not there has been such a radical change in conditions as to defeat the purpose of the restrictions.

Rule

Restrictive covenants in property deeds are enforceable unless there has been a radical change in conditions that defeats the purpose of the restrictions.

Restrictive covenants in property deeds are enforceable unless there has been a radical change in conditions that defeats the purpose of the restrictions.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the changes in the area were significant enough to justify lifting the restrictions. It found that the defendants' claims of changed conditions were not radical and did not undermine the residential nature of the development. The court emphasized that the original purpose of the restrictions remained intact and that the defendants had acted willfully in disregarding the covenants.

The changes relied upon by the defendants are not radical but are more or less minor and normal. They do not destroy or even injure the purposes of the restrictions. The development is still strictly a residential one.

Conclusion

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered that the injunction be extended and continued for twenty years from the original date of the restrictions.

The decree of the trial court is reversed and a decree will here be entered extending and continuing the injunction for twenty years from the 27th day of August, 1934.

Who won?

The appellants prevailed in the case because the court found that the defendants had willfully violated the building restrictions and that the original purpose of the covenants remained valid.

The evidence in this case overwhelmingly discloses that the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Shipley, deliberately sought to abrogate the restrictions which they themselves had placed upon the land and to extinguish the rights of the appellants in the covenants.

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