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Bauer v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2010 WL 1966193

Facts

John Joseph Bauer was stopped by Officer Daniel Gleason after driving through a red light. Upon approaching the vehicle, Gleason detected a strong odor of alcohol, observed Bauer's bloodshot and watery eyes, and noted that Bauer's speech was slurred. Bauer admitted to having consumed a couple of drinks and was uncooperative when asked to perform field sobriety tests, ultimately refusing to participate. Following these observations, Gleason arrested Bauer for driving while impaired, leading to the revocation of his driver's license after an implied-consent hearing.

After seeing a car drive through a red light, City of Rosemount Police Officer Daniel Gleason stopped the car, which was driven by appellant John Joseph Bauer. Gleason approached the car, and when appellant rolled down the window, Gleason noticed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage and saw that appellant's eyes were bloodshot and watery. Gleason asked appellant if he knew the color of the light that he had just traveled through, and appellant said that it was 'auburn.'

Issue

Did Officer Gleason have probable cause to invoke the implied-consent law when he stopped Bauer and subsequently arrested him for driving while impaired?

Did Officer Gleason have probable cause to invoke the implied-consent law when he stopped Bauer and subsequently arrested him for driving while impaired?

Rule

A police officer may invoke the implied-consent law if there is probable cause to believe that a person was driving while impaired and the person has refused to take a preliminary screening test.

A police officer may invoke the implied-consent law and require a person to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test if the officer 'has probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), and … the person has refused to take the screening test provided for by section 169A.41 (preliminary screening test).'

Analysis

The court analyzed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, including Bauer's admission of drinking, the strong odor of alcohol, his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and uncooperative behavior. These factors collectively provided a substantial basis for Officer Gleason to conclude that Bauer was driving while impaired, thus justifying the invocation of the implied-consent law.

Based on the totality of these circumstances, which existed before appellant refused to submit to field sobriety tests, Gleason had a substantial basis for believing that appellant was driving a motor vehicle while impaired. These circumstances would lead a cautious person to believe that appellant was driving while under the influence.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Officer Gleason had probable cause to invoke the implied-consent law based on the totality of the circumstances.

This court does not review probable cause determinations de novo, instead, we determine if the police officer had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed at the time of invoking the implied consent law.

Who won?

The Commissioner of Public Safety prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the revocation of Bauer's driver's license based on the officer's probable cause.

The district court concluded that Gleason had probable cause to invoke the implied-consent law under Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b)(3) (2008), and sustained the revocation of appellant's license.

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