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Keywords

lawsuitdamagesnegligenceliabilitystatuteappealtrialcontributory negligencerespondent
negligenceliabilitystatuteappealtrialrespondent

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Bauman by Chapman v. Crawford, 104 Wash.2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181

Facts

On April 24, 1979, 14-year-old Donald Bauman was riding his bicycle without a headlight when he collided with a car driven by the respondent after dark. The collision occurred at an intersection in Seattle, resulting in Bauman suffering a broken leg that required multiple surgeries and hospitalization. Bauman's guardian filed a lawsuit against the motorist, claiming damages, while the motorist's defense included allegations of contributory negligence on Bauman's part due to his violation of local ordinances requiring bicycle headlights.

On April 24, 1979, at approximately 9:30 p.m., the bicycle ridden by petitioner Donald Bauman collided with the automobile driven by respondent.

Issue

Whether the negligence per se doctrine should apply to minors, or if minors should be judged solely by the special child's standard of care in civil negligence actions.

We hold that a minor's violation of a statute does not constitute proof of negligence per se, but may, in proper cases, be introduced as evidence of a minor's negligence.

Rule

A minor's violation of a statute does not constitute proof of negligence per se but may be introduced as evidence of negligence, provided the jury finds that a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, maturity, and experience would not have acted in violation of the statute under similar circumstances.

A violation of statute by minor six to 16 years of age does not constitute proof of negligence per se, but may, in proper cases, be introduced as evidence of minor's negligence.

Analysis

The court determined that the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding negligence per se was inappropriate for a minor. It emphasized that the special standard of care for children should apply, allowing the jury to consider the minor's statutory violation as evidence of negligence, but not as definitive proof. The court remanded the case for a new trial on liability, ensuring that the jury would be instructed on the special child's standard of care.

We therefore remand for a new trial on the issue of liability under proper instructions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of liability, while affirming the damages award.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Who won?

The prevailing party was Donald Bauman, as the Supreme Court ruled in his favor regarding the application of the negligence per se doctrine to minors.

The Supreme Court, Pearson, J., held that: (1) violation of statute by minor six to 16 years of age does not constitute proof of negligence per se, but may, in proper cases, be introduced as evidence of minor's negligence.

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