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Keywords

trustwillcorporationappellee
attorneystatuteappealtrustwillcorporationappellee

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Baxley v. Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank, 334 So.2d 848

Facts

Mrs. Elmorene B. Allan's husband predeceased her, leaving her a life estate in a marital trust with a power of appointment over the remainder. In her will, Mrs. Allan attempted to exercise this power to create a trust for an educational foundation, but the proposed corporation was never formed. After her death, the Birmingham Trust National Bank claimed she had exercised her power, but this was contested by the administrator of her husband's estate, leading to a circuit court ruling that she had not effectively exercised her power of appointment.

Mrs. Allan, in a will dated October 26, 1970, attempted to exercise her power of appointment by means of the following provisions: ‘I hereby exercise the power of appointment to direct the disposition of certain property given me under the provisions of the Will of my beloved husband, W. L. Allan, by his Will dated March 20, 1969…'

Issue

Did Mrs. Allan effectively exercise her power of appointment under her husband's will, thereby allowing the remainder of the marital trust property to pass under her will?

The basic substantive issue on this appeal is the validity of a gift in trust to a trust entity which the testatrix in her will directed her executor to create after her death where the will failed to specify the purposes or details of the proposed trust corporation.

Rule

Extrinsic materials cannot be considered to validate a charitable trust if the will fails to specify its charitable nature or purposes, and the doctrines of incorporation by reference and facts of independent significance do not apply.

To allow unbridled or extensive reference to extrinsic materials would undermine the policies behind the testamentary formalities required by statute.

Analysis

The court determined that Mrs. Allan's will did not provide sufficient detail regarding the charitable purpose of the proposed trust, nor did it meet the requirements for incorporating extrinsic materials. The court emphasized that the intent of the testator must be clear from the will itself, and since the will lacked specific instructions, it could not rely on external documents to ascertain Mrs. Allan's intentions.

Our review of the various extrinsic materials included in the transcript of this case has failed to convince us that any of those materials are clearly the materials referred to in Mrs. Allan's will as ‘the written terms and conditions which I have given to the law firm of Sadler, Sadler, Sullivan & Sharp.’

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that Mrs. Allan did not effectively exercise her power of appointment, and thus the property would pass under her husband's will.

In view of the result we have reached on the merits of this case, we find it unnecessary to consider the appellees' contention that the Attorney General does not have standing to prosecute this appeal.

Who won?

The appellees, represented by Alfred Swedlaw, prevailed because the court found that Mrs. Allan's will did not effectively create a charitable trust due to its lack of specificity.

The Attorney General of Alabama, The Honorable William J. Baxley, as the representative of the unknown beneficiaries of a public trust, appeals from a judgment that the allegedly public trust here in question was never effectively created and that, therefore, a bequest left to that trust under the will of Mrs. Elmorene B. Allan must fail.

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