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Keywords

contractattorneyappealtrialworkers' compensationadministrative law
attorneyrespondent

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Beeson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colo., 942 P.2d 1314, 21 Colorado Journal 23, 21 Colorado Journal 301

Facts

Alev Beeson suffered a compensable injury in November 1989 and retained attorney Marshall A. Fogel to represent her, agreeing orally to a 20 percent contingency fee. In 1992, she settled her workers' compensation claim for $45,000, with Fogel receiving $8,993 in fees. In 1994, Beeson, now represented by another attorney, sought to reopen her claim and recover the fees paid to Fogel, but the Administrative Law Judge denied her requests, leading to an appeal.

The basic facts are undisputed. After claimant suffered a compensable injury in November 1989, she retained respondent Marshall A. Fogel, an attorney, to represent her on her compensation claim. No written agreement was signed, but she orally agreed to a 20 percent contingency fee.

Issue

Whether the oral contract between Beeson and Fogel regarding attorney fees was enforceable and whether Fogel's fees should be returned to Beeson.

1 Claimant contends that Fogel's fees constituted an unlawful contingent fee in violation of C.R.C.P. ch. 23.3, and that, as a matter of law, they must be disgorged and returned to claimant. We disagree.

Rule

Contingent fee agreements must comply with C.R.C.P. ch. 23.3, which requires a written agreement for enforceability. Fees may also be justified under the theory of quantum meruit if the attorney conferred a benefit that the client accepted.

Recovery of attorney fees under an express contingency is limited by C.R.C.P. ch. 23.3. governing contingency fee agreements.

Analysis

The court determined that the oral agreement between Beeson and Fogel did not meet the requirements of C.R.C.P. ch. 23.3, making it unenforceable. However, it found that Fogel's fees could be justified under quantum meruit, as there was substantial evidence that the fees reflected the reasonable value of his services. The court upheld the Panel's conclusion that Fogel was entitled to retain the fees.

Here, the ALJ found several factors pertinent in determining the reasonableness of Fogel's fees, including but not limited to the time and labor involved, the results obtained, and the nature and the length of his professional relationship with claimant.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel, concluding that Beeson was not entitled to recover the attorney fees paid to Fogel.

Order affirmed.

Who won?

Marshall A. Fogel prevailed in the case because the court found that his fees were reasonable under quantum meruit, despite the lack of a written agreement.

However, it affirmed the order denying recovery of the attorney fees on an alternative ground, concluding that: (1) Fogel could have recovered fees based on quantum meruit even in the absence of an express fee agreement; (2) there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that Fogel's fee reflected the reasonable value of his services; and (3) Fogel therefore was not required to return the fees to claimant.

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