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defendantliensjury instructions
defendantstatuteoverruledjury instructions

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Belevin-Ramales; U.S. v.

Facts

The defendant was charged with violating 8 U.S.C.S. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The government proposed a jury instruction that stated the government did not have to prove that the defendant harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement. The defendant argued that the jury instruction should require proof of intent to prevent detection of an illegal alien.

The Defendant argues that the jury should be instructed that the government must prove that Defendant acted with 'intent to prevent detection of an 'illegal' alien.' (Rec. No. 30 at 4). In support of his argument, the Defendant cites to Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1928).

Issue

The issue was the proper definition of 'harbor' in 8 U.S.C.S. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).

The issue in this case is the proper definition of 'harbor.'

Rule

The term 'harbor' means to afford shelter to, and includes any conduct tending to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally.

The term 'harbor' means to afford shelter to, and includes any conduct tending to substantially facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally.

Analysis

The court analyzed the proposed jury instructions and noted that the Sixth Circuit clearly stated that the word 'harbor' means to clandestinely shelter, succor, and protect improperly admitted aliens. The court recognized that while other circuits may have differing interpretations, it was bound by the Sixth Circuit's definition.

The Court recognizes that Susjnar is a 1928 case and was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Evans or the 1952 amendments to the statute. Nevertheless, neither Evans nor the 1952 amendments contain any language which would warrant a holding that Susjnar has been abrogated or implicitly overruled.

Conclusion

The court concluded that any jury instructions must define the term 'harbor' in a manner consistent with Sixth Circuit caselaw and should not state that the government did not have to prove that the defendant harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement.

Accordingly, any jury instructions in this case must define the term 'harbor' in a manner consistent with Susjnar and should not state that 'government does not have to prove that the Defendant harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement.'

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case as the court upheld the necessity of proving intent in the jury instructions regarding the term 'harbor'.

The government proposed a jury instruction that stated the government did not have to prove that the defendant harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement.

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