Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

jurisdictionstatutepleafelonydeportation
jurisdictionstatutepleafelonydeportation

Related Cases

Lukowski v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
View Case »
Weiland v. Lynch
View Case »
Benitez-De Los Santos; U.S. v.
View Case »
Dulal-Whiteway v. Department of Homeland Security
View Case »
Lopez v. U.S. Attorney Gen.
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Bell v. Reno

Facts

Petitioner, a native of Panama, was admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1965. In 1985, he pleaded guilty to first-degree sodomy charges stemming from sexual acts he performed on three minors and was sentenced to five to fifteen years imprisonment. The INS commenced removal proceedings against him in February 1998, charging that he was deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry into the United States.

Petitioner, a native of Panama, was admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1965. In 1985, he pleaded guilty to first-degree sodomy charges stemming from sexual acts he performed on three minors and was sentenced to five to fifteen years imprisonment. The INS commenced removal proceedings against him in February 1998, charging that he was deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry into the United States.

Issue

Whether the prospective temporal limitation on aggravated felony deportations set forth in ADAA 7344(b) was preserved by IMMAct 602(c).

Whether the prospective temporal limitation on aggravated felony deportations set forth in ADAA 7344(b) was preserved by IMMAct 602(c).

Rule

The court applied the principle that the amendments made by the Immigration Act of 1990, specifically 602, stand on their own as an independent effective date provision for the redesignation of the aggravated felony deportation ground.

The court applied the principle that the amendments made by the Immigration Act of 1990, specifically 602, stand on their own as an independent effective date provision for the redesignation of the aggravated felony deportation ground.

Analysis

The court found that the BIA's interpretation of IMMAct 602(c) was reasonable, despite the ambiguity in the statute. The court concluded that the amendments made by IMMAct 602 superseded the prospective temporal limitation of ADAA 7344(b), thus rendering the petitioner deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

The court found that the BIA's interpretation of IMMAct 602(c) was reasonable, despite the ambiguity in the statute. The court concluded that the amendments made by IMMAct 602 superseded the prospective temporal limitation of ADAA 7344(b), thus rendering the petitioner deportable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Conclusion

The petition for review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner was deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry into the United States.

The petition for review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner was deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry into the United States.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's determination that the petitioner was deportable under the aggravated felony provision.

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's determination that the petitioner was deportable under the aggravated felony provision.

You must be