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contractdefendantattorneytrialverdictmotion
contractplaintiffdefendantattorneyappealtrialverdictmotion

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Belli v. Shaw, 98 Wash.2d 569, 657 P.2d 315

Facts

Melvin Belli brought an action against partners in a Yakima law firm for $50,000 in attorney fees based on a fee agreement allegedly made in 1959. The case stemmed from a defamation action involving Wade Church, where a contingent fee arrangement was established that included Belli, J.P. Tonkoff, and an Arizona attorney. However, before the second trial, a new fee agreement was made between Church and the other attorneys that excluded Belli, leading to the dispute over the attorney fees.

Plaintiff Melvin Belli appeals a Court of Appeals decision affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in his action for attorney fees. Plaintiff brought this action in 1977 against defendants, partners in a Yakima law firm, claiming $50,000 in attorney fees pursuant to a fee agreement allegedly made in 1959 with J.P. Tonkoff, a former partner in the Yakima firm.

Issue

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding the existence of a fee agreement entitling Belli to recover attorney fees.

The only issue before us is predominantly factual: Whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule

A motion for judgment n.o.v. should not be granted unless the court can say, as a matter of law, that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference therefrom sufficient to sustain the verdict. There must be 'substantial evidence' to support the verdict.

A motion for a judgment n.o.v. should not be granted unless the court can say, as a matter of law, that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference therefrom sufficient to sustain the verdict.

Analysis

The court found that the evidence did not support Belli's claim for fees, as the original fee agreement was replaced by a new agreement that excluded him. The court noted that Belli's involvement in the case after the first trial was minimal and that the new agreement constituted a repudiation of any prior contract with him. The court concluded that Belli's claim was based on an unenforceable 'forwarding fee' arrangement, which violated professional conduct rules.

The undisputed evidence shows, therefore, as a matter of law, that Church's contract with plaintiff was repudiated by 1971. There is no evidence that Church entered into any new arrangement with plaintiff.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Belli.

Affirmed.

Who won?

Defendants prevailed in the case because the court found no substantial evidence to support Belli's claim for attorney fees, as the new fee agreement excluded him from any recovery.

Defendants prevailed in the case because the court found no substantial evidence to support Belli's claim for attorney fees, as the new fee agreement excluded him from any recovery.

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