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Keywords

lawsuitplaintiffappealdiscriminationconciliation
appealdiscriminationfreedom of speechconciliation

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Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 23 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 20, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,029, 29 Fed.R.Serv.2d 960

Facts

In April 1976, Gulf Oil and the EEOC entered into a conciliation agreement addressing alleged racial discrimination at the Port Arthur plant, which was not signed by any employees. Plaintiffs, representing a class of black employees and applicants, filed a lawsuit in May 1976, claiming discrimination in various employment practices. Gulf Oil sought a court order to limit communications between the plaintiffs and potential class members, leading to a temporary order that was later modified by the district court. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of this order, which ultimately restricted their ability to communicate about the lawsuit.

In April 1976, Gulf and EEOC entered into an extra-judicial conciliation agreement covering alleged racial discrimination against blacks at the Port Arthur plant and providing for conciliation of alleged discriminatory practices and for back pay to 614 present and former black employees.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the district court's order restricting communication between the parties and potential class members constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech.

The district court's order which broadly restricted communication by parties and their counsel with actual and potential class members was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.

Rule

The court applied the principle that prior restraints on speech are disfavored and must meet a heavy presumption against their constitutionality, requiring justification that they prevent direct, immediate, and irreparable harm.

Prior restraints on freedom of speech have long been disfavored in American law.

Analysis

The Court of Appeals found that the district court's order imposed a significant restriction on First Amendment rights without sufficient justification. The order was deemed a prior restraint because it prohibited specific communications under judicial censorship, failing to meet the necessary constitutional standards. The court emphasized that the communications involved were protected expressions, and the order did not fit within any exceptions allowing for prior restraints.

The order represents a significant restriction on First Amendment rights.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order and reversed its judgment, holding that the communication restrictions were unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and their counsel.

Order of district court vacated and judgment of district court reversed and remanded.

Who won?

The plaintiffs prevailed in the appeal, as the Court of Appeals found the district court's communication restrictions unconstitutional, thereby upholding their First Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals, en banc, Godbold, Circuit Judge, adopted Parts I, II and III of the panel opinion and held that: (1) the district court's order which broadly restricted communication by parties and their counsel with actual and potential class members was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.

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