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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligenceliabilitystatutetrialmotiondue processlegislative intent
tortplaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligenceliabilitystatutetrialleasedue processstrict liability

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Bhinder v. Sun Co., Inc., 263 Conn. 358, 819 A.2d 822, 20 IER Cases 1558

Facts

The defendant owned a Sunoco gasoline service station and convenience store, which had a history of criminal incidents. The decedent, Baljit Singh Bhinder, was employed at the store and was shot during a robbery. The executor of Bhinder's estate filed a wrongful death action against the store owner, claiming negligence in providing security. The store owner then filed an apportionment complaint against the assailant, which was struck down by the trial court.

The defendant was the owner of a Sunoco gasoline service station and convenience store (station) located at 336 Main Street in Norwalk. Nandu C. Patel and Sumitra N. Patel leased the station from the defendant and operated it pursuant to a franchise agreement (agreement) with the defendant. The defendant was responsible for the supervision of the franchisees, their agents and their employees. In addition, the defendant installed and supervised all security measures located at the station. Pursuant to the agreement, the station was to be operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The station had experienced a history of criminal incidents, including prior thefts and an armed robbery, of which the defendant was aware. The decedent [Baljit Singh Bhinder] was employed at the station and on April 13, 1995, he worked from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. Sometime during that time period, an armed assailant entered the premises and shot the decedent several times in the head and chest.

Issue

Whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's apportionment complaint against the apportionment defendant based on General Statutes § 52–572h (o), which precludes apportionment of damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence.

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly struck its apportionment complaint because: (1) application of No. 99–69, § 1(o), of the 1999 Public Acts (P.A. 99–69, § 1[o]), to the present case violates the doctrine of separation of powers and the due process clause of both the federal and state constitutions; and (2) even if P.A. 99–69, § 1(o), generally precludes apportionment, the defendant had a vested right to such apportionment pursuant to this court's previous decision in Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (Bhinder I).

Rule

General Statutes § 52–572h (o) prohibits the apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence.

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, there shall be no apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to, intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursuant to any cause of action created by statute.

Analysis

The court analyzed the legislative intent behind the enactment of P.A. 99–69, § 1(o), which clarified that apportionment of liability could only occur among parties liable for negligence. The court found that the statute was intended to clarify the law in response to its previous decision in Bhinder I, and thus, the retroactive application of the statute did not violate the separation of powers or due process.

We conclude that the text and legislative history of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 52–572h did not reveal an intent by the legislature for the term 'negligence' in the statute to include conduct other than negligence and, therefore, that the statute did not contemplate apportionment between a negligent defendant and an alleged intentional or reckless tortfeasor.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the application of the statute was appropriate and that the defendant did not have a vested right to apportionment against the assailant.

We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the legislature clarified General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 52–572h in enacting P.A. 99–69, § 1(o), and, therefore, retroactive application of the statute, as amended, to the present case does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or the due process clause.

Who won?

The plaintiff (executor of the estate) prevailed because the court upheld the trial court's decision to strike the defendant's apportionment complaint, affirming that the statute precluded such apportionment.

The plaintiff again moved to strike the defendant's apportionment complaint against Garcia, claiming that, in light of that act, our decision in Bhinder I was no longer good law, and that no right of apportionment existed against Garcia.

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