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Keywords

contractindemnityprecedentappealcondition precedent

contractappeal

Related Cases

Blackman v. United States Cas. Co., 9 Cates 578, 117 Tenn. 578, 103 S.W. 784

Facts

Fred D. Blackman purchased an insurance policy from the United States Casualty Company, which covered loss of time due to specific diseases, including nephritis. Blackman applied for the policy on March 30, 1903, but was already experiencing symptoms of nephritis by November 30, 1903. He failed to notify the insurance company of his illness until December 24, 1903, which was beyond the ten-day notice requirement stipulated in the policy. After Blackman's death, his widow pursued the claim, leading to the initial decree in her favor, which was later appealed by the insurance company.

The insured knew as early as November 30, 1903, that he had nephritis, yet he did not give notice to the company until the 24th of December, and therefore failed to comply with the provision of the policy which required that he should give notice within 10 days after the contracting of the disease.

Issue

Did the insured's failure to provide timely notice of his illness to the insurance company constitute a valid defense against the claim for benefits under the policy?

Rule

The policy required that written notice of any disease be given to the insurance company within ten days of its contraction, and failure to comply with this provision would forfeit all rights to indemnity.

The company shall not be held to have waived any rights by the delivery of such forms, nor by the receipt or retention of any proof or evidence. Valid claims are payable immediately on receipt of proof.

Analysis

The court analyzed the terms of the insurance policy, particularly the notice requirement, and determined that it constituted a condition precedent to recovery. The insured was aware of his nephritis on November 30, 1903, but did not notify the company until December 24, 1903, which was beyond the stipulated time frame. The court found that this failure to provide timely notice invalidated the claim, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the insured's understanding of his health condition.

We think the last clause quoted refers to and embraces within its terms the provision in respect of notice. The notice clause is either a provision or a condition.

Conclusion

The court reversed the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals and dismissed the bill, concluding that the failure to provide timely notice of the illness precluded recovery under the insurance policy.

Let the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals be reversed, and the bill dismissed, with costs.

Who won?

United States Casualty Company prevailed in the case because the court found that the insured's failure to comply with the notice requirement voided the claim for benefits.

The Court of Chancery Appeals, in its report of facts, after considering the various items of evidence, says: 'Now, in the face of all this evidence, it is simply impossible to escape the conviction that Mr. Blackman knew on November 30, 1903, that he had nephritis.'

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