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Keywords

plaintiffattorneyappealtrialtestimonyaffidavitsummary judgmentwill
plaintiffattorneyappealtrialaffidavitsummary judgmentwill

Related Cases

Britt v. Upchurch, 327 N.C. 454, 396 S.E.2d 318

Facts

Walter Hartman executed his will in 1979, leaving his residence at 2615 Cooleemee Street to his wife for life, with the remainder to his daughter, Blanche Louise Hartman Britt. At the time of his death, Hartman owned two adjoining lots: lot 36, where his residence was located, and lot 37, a vacant lot. After Hartman's death, his widow attempted to sell lot 37, claiming it passed to her under the residuary clause of Hartman's will. The plaintiff, Hartman's daughter, brought an action to quiet title to lot 37, asserting her claim under her father's will.

Walter Hartman executed his will in 1979, leaving his residence at 2615 Cooleemee Street to his wife for life, with the remainder to his daughter, Blanche Louise Hartman Britt.

Issue

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the affidavit of the attorney who drafted the testator's will was admissible at trial to show the testator's intent and in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the affidavit of the attorney who drafted the testator's will was admissible at trial to show the testator's intent and in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Rule

In North Carolina, extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify a person or thing referred to in a will when a latent ambiguity exists, but declarations of intent by a testator are not admissible to control the construction of the will or to vary its terms.

In North Carolina, extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify a person or thing referred to in a will when a latent ambiguity exists, but declarations of intent by a testator are not admissible to control the construction of the will or to vary its terms.

Analysis

The court determined that the affidavit of the attorney was inadmissible as it did not provide factual evidence of the testator's intent but rather the attorney's impressions. The court emphasized that allowing such testimony would undermine the requirement that wills be in writing and could lead to fraud. The evidence presented by the plaintiff indicated that both lots were used as a single residence, supporting the interpretation that 'my residence at 2615 Cooleemee Street' included both lots.

The court determined that the affidavit of the attorney was inadmissible as it did not provide factual evidence of the testator's intent but rather the attorney's impressions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, affirming that the phrase 'my residence at 2615 Cooleemee Street' referred to both lots 36 and 37.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, affirming that the phrase 'my residence at 2615 Cooleemee Street' referred to both lots 36 and 37.

Who won?

The plaintiff, Blanche Louise Hartman Britt, prevailed because the court found that the evidence supported her claim that both lots constituted her father's residence.

The plaintiff, Blanche Louise Hartman Britt, prevailed because the court found that the evidence supported her claim that both lots constituted her father's residence.

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