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Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Mass. 718, 147 N.E.2d 782, 68 A.L.R.2d 708

Facts

The plaintiff was convicted in Middlesex County on three indictments and sentenced to consecutive terms in 1952. Later, he was convicted in Suffolk County on five indictments and received concurrent sentences that were to start 'from and after' the expiration of the Middlesex sentences. In 1956, the Middlesex convictions were set aside, leading to the dispute over when the Suffolk sentences should commence.

On May 13, 1952, the plaintiff was convicted in Middlesex County on three indictments and was sentenced on each to from five to seven years in the State prison, the sentences to run consecutively.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the Suffolk sentences commenced on the date of imposition or on the date the Middlesex convictions were reversed.

The defendant contends that the Suffolk sentences commenced to run on April 30, 1957, the date when the plaintiff was brought into court following our decision.

Rule

The court applied the principle that a concurrent sentence can commence from the date of imposition, even if a prior sentence is set aside, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The court are all of opinion that it is no error in a judgment, in a criminal case, to make one term of imprisonment commence when another terminates.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the sentencing orders and the implications of the Middlesex convictions being set aside. It concluded that the Suffolk sentences were valid and enforceable from their imposition date, as the concurrent nature of the sentences allowed for this interpretation despite the prior convictions being voided.

We think this is the better and more humane view, for only in this way can a prisoner receive credit, not as matter of grace, but as of right, for time served under an erroneous conviction.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the decree that the plaintiff began serving his Suffolk sentences on September 23, 1952, the date they were imposed.

Decree affirmed.

Who won?

The plaintiff prevailed in the case because the court found that the Suffolk sentences commenced on the date of imposition, allowing him to receive credit for time served.

The plaintiff on the other hand contends that the decree below was right and that the Suffolk sentences commenced to run on September 23, 1952, the date of imposition.

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