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plaintiffappealtrialregulation
plaintiffdefendantjurisdictiontrial

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Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 23 A.3d 1176

Facts

Nancy Burton filed a complaint against Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. to prevent a 7 percent increase in electric power generating capacity at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, alleging that this increase would lead to unreasonable pollution and violate several state laws. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had approved the uprate, and Burton's petition to intervene in that proceeding was denied. The trial court dismissed her complaint for lack of standing, and she appealed the decision.

On August 12, 2008, the [federal] Nuclear Regulatory Commission [commission] approved [the defendant's] license amendment request for a stretch power uprate of 7 percent at Millstone Unit 3.

Issue

Did the trial court err in dismissing the plaintiff's claims for lack of standing and on the grounds of federal preemption?

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly dismissed, for lack of standing, her complaint alleging (1) a cause of action under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), (2) a claim of public nuisance, (3) classical aggrievement, and (4) a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).

Rule

Federal law preempts state claims regarding the regulation of radioactive waste, and standing requires a specific, personal legal interest that is adversely affected by the action in question.

If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.

Analysis

The court found that the plaintiff's claims regarding the increase in radioactive waste were preempted by federal law, which grants exclusive regulatory authority to the federal government over radiological safety and discharges from nuclear power plants. Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the necessary standing under CEPA or public nuisance law, as her claims did not establish a specific, personal interest that was adversely affected by the uprate.

We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim regarding an increase in the discharge of radioactive waste because Congress has preempted state authority in this area.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the claims were preempted by federal law and that the plaintiff lacked standing.

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff's contention that she can maintain her common-law public nuisance action under the reasoning of Silkwood.

Who won?

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. prevailed because the court found that federal law preempted the plaintiff's claims and that she lacked standing to bring her case.

The defendant responds that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds.

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