Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

litigationtrialprobatetrustwill
trialprobatetrustwill

Related Cases

Carnegie v. First Nat. Bank of Brunswick, 218 Ga. 585, 129 S.E.2d 780

Facts

Mrs. Lucy C. Carnegie executed her will in 1912, which included provisions for a trust concerning Cumberland Island, Georgia. Upon her death in 1916, her will was probated, and the trust was established to terminate upon the death of her last surviving child. The last surviving child, Florence C. Perkins, died in 1962, leading to litigation over the distribution of the trust property. The adopted son of one of Mrs. Carnegie's grandsons, Henry Carter Carnegie, claimed a share of the trust property, which was contested by the natural great-grandsons.

The testatrix, Mrs. Lucy C. Carnegie, was a resident of the State of Pennsylvania. She executed her will in 1912 and made two codicils in 1913. Upon her death on January 16, 1916, her will, with these codicils, was duly probated in both Pennsylvania and Georgia.

Issue

Whether the adopted son of one of the testatrix's grandsons is entitled to any interest in certain property under her will and, if so, the quantity of that interest.

The issues for determination here are whether an adopted son of one of the testatrix's grandsons is entitled to any interest in certain property under her will and, if so, the quantity of that interest.

Rule

The applicable intestate law of Pennsylvania is that which was in force when the trust terminated in 1962, which provides that an adopted person is considered the issue of their adopting parents and not their natural parents.

The State of Pennsylvania's Intestate Act of 1947, of force in 1962, provides: ‘For purposes of descent by, from and through an adopted person he shall be considered the issue of his adopting parent or parents and not the issue of his natural parents * * *’ Act 1947, April 24, P.L. 80, § 8 (20 P.S. § 1.8).

Analysis

The court determined that the will's language indicated the testatrix's intent for the intestate laws of Pennsylvania to govern the distribution of the trust property upon the death of her last surviving child. The court found that the adopted son was included as a remainderman under the intestate laws in effect at the time of the last child's death, which recognized adopted children as heirs. The court rejected the argument that the will intended to exclude adopted children from inheritance.

As we view it, Mrs. Carnegie's will gives a clear expression of her intent that the law to be applied to ascertain the remaindermen should be that of force when the trust terminated. She employed these words: ‘In the event the trust herein created for said Island property, or any portion thereof, has not terminated before the death of the last survivor of my said children * * * the trust shall then terminate and the whole or any portion thereof remaining unsold shall be vested, but not before, absolutely in such persons and for such estates and proportions as would take the same under the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania had I died intestate possessed thereof, and all of my named children had survived me and died intestate * * *.’

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Henry Carter Carnegie, the adopted son, is a remainderman under Mrs. Carnegie's will and entitled to a one-tenth interest in the trust property.

Judgment affirmed.

Who won?

Henry Carter Carnegie prevailed in the case as the court recognized his rights as a remainderman under the will, affirming that adopted children are entitled to inherit under Pennsylvania's intestate laws.

The trial court correctly decreed that the adopted son of a grandson of the testatrix is a remainderman under her will.

You must be