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Keywords

tortnegligenceliabilityvicarious liability

tortnegligence

Related Cases

Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 815 A.2d 460

Facts

On January 15, 1997, Alice Reynolds, while returning home from a client visit, struck pedestrian David Carter in Belmar, New Jersey. Reynolds was employed by the accounting firm Stevens, Fluhr, Chismar, Alvino & Schechter, CPA, and was required to use her personal vehicle for work-related travel. The firm reimbursed her for business mileage, and she spent a significant portion of her work time visiting clients. At the time of the accident, Reynolds was returning home after completing her duties for the day.

On January 15, 1997, Alice Reynolds, while returning home from a client visit, struck pedestrian David Carter in Belmar, New Jersey.

Issue

Whether the doctrine of respondeat superior can be invoked to hold an employer vicariously liable for the tort of an employee who was required to use her personal vehicle for work-related tasks.

Rule

An employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.

Under respondeat superior, an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.

Analysis

The court applied the required-vehicle exception to the going and coming rule, determining that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Since she was required to use her personal vehicle for work-related tasks and was returning from a client visit at the time of the accident, the court found that her actions served both her interests and those of her employer, thus establishing vicarious liability.

The court applied the required-vehicle exception to the going and coming rule, determining that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment, and therefore, her employer was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

Who won?

David Carter prevailed in the case because the court found that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, which made her employer liable.

David Carter prevailed in the case because the court found that Reynolds was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident.

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