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Keywords

lawsuitplaintiffdefendantappealwilltrademark
trialwilltrademarkbench trial

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Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1996 Fed.App. 0094P

Facts

Champions Golf Club, Inc. of Houston, Texas, filed a lawsuit against The Champions Golf Club, Inc. of Nicholasville, Kentucky, alleging service mark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act. The Houston club, established in 1959, had been using the CHAMPIONS mark since 1960 and had registered it in Texas. The Nicholasville club began using the same mark in 1986 and registered it in Kentucky. The district court ruled in favor of Nicholasville, concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two clubs' use of the mark.

Issue

Whether there is a likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act.

Whether there is likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement or unfair competition action under Lanham Act is mixed question of fact and law.

Rule

The likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement actions under the Lanham Act is determined by considering several factors, including the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the relatedness of the services, the similarity of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, the likely degree of purchaser care, the defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion of product lines.

Analysis

In applying the rule to the facts, the court noted that both clubs provided similar services and had overlapping membership from various states. The term 'Champions' was found not to be arbitrary, as it closely related to golf. The district court's conclusion that there was no likelihood of confusion was challenged, particularly regarding the strength of the mark and the relatedness of the services offered by both clubs.

The district court concluded that 'since Houston's mark is arbitrary, it is strong as a matter of law,' but provided no explanation for its conclusion that the mark was arbitrary. The term 'champions,' while having a 'significance recognized in everyday life,' is obviously not a term that is 'unrelated' to golfing services, and unrelatedness is central to the definition of an arbitrary term.

Conclusion

The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to reconsider the likelihood of confusion.

For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the district court's opinion, and remand for further proceedings.

Who won?

The prevailing party in the initial ruling was The Champions Golf Club, Inc. of Nicholasville, Kentucky. The district court found that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two clubs' use of the CHAMPIONS mark, leading to a judgment in favor of Nicholasville. However, this ruling was vacated on appeal, indicating that the case will be re-evaluated.

The district court issued a judgment for Nicholasville following a bench trial, concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion in the parties' use of the CHAMPIONS mark.

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