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Keywords

liabilitytrialsustainedduty of care

negligenceliabilitystatuteappealtrialsustainedduty of carecommon law

Related Cases

Churchman v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 39 Cal.App.5th 246, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 167, 19 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8579, 2019 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8298

Facts

Alice B. Churchman purchased a train ticket at a station operated by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District and proceeded to the boarding platform. While on the platform, she encountered several confusing factors, including the opening and closing of train doors, unclear public address announcements, and the movements of other passengers, which caused her to lose her balance and fall. Churchman subsequently sued the District for violating its duty of care as a common carrier.

In her third amended complaint, Alice B. Churchman alleged she bought a train ticket at a station operated by the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (District). She passed through turnstiles and went to the boarding platform. Several factors combined to create a confusing situation on the platform: the 'opening and closing of doors on opposite side [sic] of the cars'; partially inaudible and confusing instructions broadcast over the public address system; and 'abrupt turns and moves' by other passengers trying to board a train.

Issue

Did the train operator owe the passenger a heightened duty of care under Civil Code section 2100 for injuries sustained on the boarding platform?

Rule

Civil Code section 2100 imposes a heightened standard of care that common carriers owe to their passengers, requiring them to use the utmost care and diligence for safe carriage. However, this heightened duty generally does not apply to passengers waiting in or passing through a station or terminal.

Civil Code section 2100 applies to both public and private common carriers and therefore is a proper basis for public agency liability. The statute imposes a heightened standard of care that common carriers owe to their passengers: 'A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.'

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the District owed Churchman a heightened duty of care due to her status as a passenger. It concluded that the injuries she sustained were caused by ordinary risks associated with a busy train platform, such as crowds and noise, rather than by any mobile hazards or conditions that would trigger the heightened duty of care. The court referenced previous cases that established that common carriers are only required to exercise ordinary care for passengers in non-boarding situations.

Here, the trial court correctly ruled that Civil Code section 2100 does not extend to Churchman's injuries, which were caused by ordinary risks of a busy train platform: crowds of people moving in multiple directions, noise, partially inaudible announcements on the public address system, and train doors abruptly opening and closing as passengers board and disembark.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action, concluding that there was no statutory basis for liability under Civil Code section 2100 for the injuries Churchman sustained.

The judgment is affirmed. Churchman shall bear the District's costs on appeal.

Who won?

Bay Area Rapid Transit District prevailed in the case because the court found that it did not owe a heightened duty of care to Churchman under the circumstances of her injury.

The District demurred on the ground it has no common law negligence liability and its liability as a common carrier applies only to passengers in transit, i.e., aboard the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) train.

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