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Keywords

habeas corpusparoleextraditionlegislative intent
statuteappealparoleextraditionlegislative intent

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Clark v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 380, 917 A.2d 1

Facts

Kenneth Clark was extradited involuntarily from Texas to Connecticut in 1996 due to an outstanding parole violation. After being incarcerated in Connecticut until April 2000, the governor of Texas issued a demand for Clark's extradition on April 17, 2003, stating he was a fugitive from justice. The Connecticut governor issued a warrant for Clark's arrest, which occurred on May 2, 2003. Clark filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his status as a fugitive.

In 1996, the petitioner had been extradited involuntarily from Texas to this state because of an outstanding parole violation. After having been returned to this state, the petitioner was incarcerated here until April, 2000.

Issue

Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Kenneth Clark, who was removed to Connecticut under legal compulsion, is not subject to extradition to Texas under the mandatory provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

The sole issue raised by this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the petitioner, Kenneth Clark, who was charged with a crime in Texas and thereafter removed to this state under legal compulsion, is not subject to extradition to Texas under the mandatory provisions of the act because, having been removed from Texas involuntarily, he is not a fugitive from justice for purposes of the act.

Rule

Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the governor has a mandatory duty to comply with a demand for extradition of a person who is a fugitive from justice and is found in this state.

Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (act), General Statutes § 54–157 et seq., the governor of this state has a mandatory duty to comply with a demand by the executive authority of another state for the extradition of a person who, having been charged with a crime in the demanding state, is a fugitive from justice and is found in this state.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, particularly focusing on the definitions of 'fugitive from justice.' It concluded that the Appellate Court's interpretation, which suggested that involuntary removal from the demanding state negated fugitive status, was incorrect. The court emphasized that the historical context and legislative intent behind the act supported the view that individuals who have committed crimes and left the demanding state, regardless of the circumstances of their departure, are considered fugitives subject to mandatory extradition.

We agree with the commissioner that the petitioner is a fugitive from justice whom the governor of this state is required to extradite to Texas.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that Kenneth Clark is a fugitive from justice and must be extradited to Texas.

Judgment of Appellate Court reversed and remanded.

Who won?

The Commissioner of Correction prevailed in the case, as the Supreme Court ruled that the Appellate Court's conclusion was incorrect and reaffirmed the mandatory duty of the governor to extradite fugitives.

The commissioner further maintained that this interpretation of the act is buttressed by § 54–159, which requires that all demands for extradition, except those made for nonfugitives under General Statutes § 54–162, shall allege, inter alia, that the person whose extradition is sought has 'fled from' that state, thereby reflecting a legislative intent that all persons who commit a crime in the demanding state and thereafter are found in another state, including those persons who were removed involuntarily from the demanding state, shall be treated as fugitives subject to mandatory extradition.

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