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Keywords

appealhabeas corpusleaseparoleliens

attorneystatutehabeas corpusparolerespondentliens

Related Cases

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734, 73 USLW 4100, 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 301, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 400, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 55

Facts

Sergio Suarez Martinez and Daniel Benitez, both Cuban nationals, arrived in the U.S. during the Mariel boatlift and were paroled into the country. They became inadmissible due to prior criminal convictions and were ordered removed. Martinez was detained beyond the 90-day removal period and challenged his detention through a habeas corpus petition, which was granted by the District Court. Benitez's similar petition was denied, leading to appeals in both cases.

Sergio Suarez Martinez (respondent in No. 03–878) and Daniel Benitez (petitioner in No. 03–7434) arrived in the United States from Cuba in June 1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift… The Attorney General revoked Martinez's parole in December 2000. Martinez was taken into custody by the INS, and removal proceedings were commenced against him.

Issue

Whether the statutory provision allowing the detention of inadmissible aliens beyond the removal period applies the same reasonable time limitation established in Zadvydas v. Davis.

The question presented by these cases, and the question that evoked contradictory answers from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, is whether this construction of § 1231(a)(6) that we applied to the second category of aliens covered by the statute applies as well to the first—that is, to the category of aliens 'ordered removed who [are] inadmissible under [§]1182.'

Rule

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the Secretary may detain inadmissible aliens beyond the 90-day removal period only for as long as is reasonably necessary to achieve removal, with a presumptive period of six months.

Under § 1231(a)(6), the Secretary may detain inadmissible aliens beyond the 90-day removal period, but only for so long as is reasonably necessary to achieve removal.

Analysis

The Court applied the reasoning from Zadvydas, which interpreted § 1231(a)(6) to limit detention to a reasonable time necessary for removal. The Court found that the same principles apply to inadmissible aliens, establishing that both Martinez and Benitez had been detained well beyond the six-month presumptive period without a substantial likelihood of removal.

The Government having suggested no reason that the time reasonably necessary for removal is longer for an inadmissible alien, this same 6–month presumptive detention period applies in these cases.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and reversed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, holding that both Martinez and Benitez were entitled to release due to their prolonged detention without foreseeable removal.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and remand both cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Martinez and Benitez prevailed in their habeas corpus petitions because the Court determined their continued detention was not justified under the statutory framework.

The Court determined that removal to Cuba is not reasonably foreseeable; the petitions for habeas corpus should have been granted.

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