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Keywords

lawsuittortplaintiffdefendantnegligenceliabilityappealtrialsovereign immunity

defendantappealtrialwillsovereign immunity

Related Cases

Collins v. Plant Insulation Co., 185 Cal.App.4th 260, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 241, 75 Cal. Comp. Cases 861, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6933, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8258

Facts

Ulysses Collins, a welder who worked extensively with asbestos at various shipyards, died from mesothelioma in 2005. His family brought a lawsuit against several entities, including Plant Insulation Company, claiming negligence and products liability. At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the Navy could not be included in the apportionment of fault due to federal sovereign immunity, which the trial court accepted. The jury allocated fault among several entities but was instructed not to consider the Navy.

Collins worked as a welder at the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard from 1960 to 1973, and as a boilermaker welder at the Standard Oil Refinery in Richmond from 1973 through 1976.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in excluding the U.S. Navy from the list of entities to which the jury could apportion fault under Proposition 51.

Defendant Plant Insulation Company appeals from the judgment against it in this asbestos case, claiming the trial court erred in excluding the United States Navy from the list of entities as to which the jury could apportion 'fault' pursuant to Proposition 51.

Rule

Proposition 51 allows for the apportionment of fault among all entities responsible for a plaintiff's injury, regardless of whether some entities are immune from liability.

Proposition 51 thus contemplates a defendant's fault will be 'compared to all other 'fault' responsible for the injury.'

Analysis

The Court of Appeal analyzed the nature of the Navy's immunity and concluded that it did not preclude the allocation of fault under Proposition 51. The court distinguished between immunity from suit and a determination that conduct is not wrongful, asserting that the Navy's actions could still be considered tortious for the purpose of fault allocation.

The discretionary function exception to the federal government's waiver of its sovereign immunity in the FTCA represents a policy decision by Congress that certain actions of the United States, even if wrongful, are immune from suit.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a retrial limited to the apportionment of fault, including the Navy as a potential tortfeasor.

Reversed and remanded.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the defendant, Plant Insulation Company, as the appellate court agreed with its argument that the Navy should be included in the apportionment of fault.

We agree, and reverse and remand for a retrial on apportionment.

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