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statuteappealtrialdue processdouble jeopardy
statuteappealsustainedappellant

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Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584

Facts

Colten, along with a group of college students, gathered at the Blue Grass Airport to support a gubernatorial candidate. After the demonstration, they formed a procession of cars, during which a state policeman stopped one car for an expired license plate. Colten approached the officer to inquire about the situation, but despite multiple requests from police to disperse, he refused to leave, leading to his arrest for disorderly conduct. Initially fined $10 in an inferior court, he was later convicted in a circuit court and fined $50.

Colten was convicted of violating Ky.Rev.Stat. s 437.016(1)(f) (Supp.1968), which states: ‘(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: ‘(f) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse . . ..’

Issue

Did the application of the disorderly conduct statute violate Colten's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and was the two-tier trial system unconstitutional under the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses?

Appellant challenges his Kentucky conviction for disorderly conduct on the ground that the conviction and the State's statute are repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Rule

The disorderly conduct statute prohibits congregating in a public place and refusing to comply with a lawful police dispersal order if done with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. The two-tier system allows for a trial de novo without imposing a penalty for seeking a new trial.

The disorderly conduct statute makes it an offense for a person with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, to congregate with others in a public place and refuse to comply with a lawful police dispersal order.

Analysis

The court found that Colten's actions did not constitute a lawful exercise of constitutional rights, as he was interfering with police duties. The statute was deemed not vague or overbroad, as it required a predominant intent to cause inconvenience. The two-tier system was upheld, as it provided a fresh determination of guilt without the risk of judicial vindictiveness.

The evidence warranted a finding, the Kentucky court concluded, that at the time of his arrest, ‘Colten was not undertaking to exercise any constitutionally protected freedom.’

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the disorderly conduct statute was constitutionally applied and that the two-tier trial system did not violate due process or double jeopardy.

The judgment of the Kentucky Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Who won?

The Commonwealth of Kentucky prevailed, as the court upheld the conviction and the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained the statute as applied because the inconvenience and annoyance to the police far outweighed appellant's speech which fell ‘far below the level of minimum social value.’

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