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Keywords

defendanttrialwilldivorcecommon lawadmissibility

defendanttrialwilldivorcecommon law

Related Cases

Com. v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203

Facts

The defendant and the victim, who was his wife, had separated and were in the process of divorce when the defendant forcibly entered her apartment and raped her. The victim had obtained a judgment nisi in the divorce proceedings, which was to become final months later. On the night of the incident, the victim was home alone with her children when the defendant broke in, assaulted her, and forced her to have sexual intercourse against her will. The police were called, and evidence of the assault was documented, including the victim's injuries and the presence of semen.

The defendant and his wife (the victim) were married on October 13, 1968. On May 4, 1978, the victim separated from the defendant and thereafter instituted divorce proceedings. A judgment nisi was granted to the victim on October 10, 1978. Under G.L. c. 208, s 21, the judgment was to become final on April 10, 1979. The victim did not reside with the defendant at any time after May 5, 1978.

Issue

Did the trial judge err in ruling that the spousal relationship was no defense to the charge of rape, and were the evidentiary rulings and jury selection process proper?

The defendant contends that the trial judge erroneously ruled that the fact that the victim was the defendant's wife was no defense to a charge of rape under G.L. c. 265, s 22, as amended by St. 1974, c. 474, s 1.

Rule

Under Massachusetts law, the fact that the victim was the defendant's spouse does not bar a conviction for rape, especially when a divorce judgment nisi has been entered. The court also held that the trial judge has discretion in jury selection and evidentiary rulings.

At common law, rape was defined as 'the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.' The earliest statutory prohibition of rape in the laws of the Commonwealth appeared in 1649: 'If any man shall ravish any maid, or single woman, committing carnal copulation with her by force, against her own will … he shall be punished either with death or with some other grievous punishment according to circumstances ….'

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining the context of the spousal relationship and the legal implications of the divorce judgment nisi. It found that the defendant had sufficient warning that his conduct was unlawful, as common law recognized that nonconsensual sexual intercourse between spouses could constitute rape under certain circumstances. The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding jury selection and the admissibility of evidence, concluding that they did not infringe upon the defendant's rights.

We think that the modernization of the language of G.L. c. 265, s 22, and the omission of the word 'unlawful' from the revised G.L. c. 277, s 39, worked further changes upon the law of rape by abandoning the common law spousal exclusion.

Conclusion

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant's convictions, concluding that there was no error in the trial court's rulings and that the defendant's actions constituted rape under the law.

We find no error and therefore affirm the convictions.

Who won?

The Commonwealth prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the convictions based on the application of the law regarding spousal rape and the evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

The Commonwealth points to the pre-1974 version of G.L. c. 277, s 39, as specifically incorporating the common law spousal exclusion by its use of the word 'unlawful.'

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Related Cases

People v. Chapman, 194 Ill.2d 186, 743 N.E.2d 48, 252 Ill.Dec. 474

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People v. Dupree, 486 Mich. 693, 788 N.W.2d 399

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