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Keywords

appealtrialburden of proofbeyond a reasonable doubtappellant
defendanttrialburden of proofbeyond a reasonable doubtappellant

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Com. v. Heatherington, 477 Pa. 562, 385 A.2d 338

Facts

The appellant was the manager of a bar in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, where he lived above the establishment. On March 30, 1975, after a night of drinking, an argument ensued between the appellant and the victim, a long-time friend. As the appellant attempted to leave, the victim followed him, allegedly threatening him. The appellant claimed the victim grabbed him from behind, prompting him to pull out a handgun and shoot the victim twice, resulting in death. Witnesses had differing accounts of the events leading up to the shooting, particularly regarding the victim's actions.

A review of the record discloses the following facts. Appellant was the manager of a bar owned by his father in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Appellant lived in an apartment above the bar. On the evening of March 30, 1975, the victim and appellant were seated at the bar engaged in a discussion. At about 12:45 a. m. on March 31, 1975, appellant told the barmaid that he intended to retire soon for the night and asked her to serve everyone a complimentary drink for Easter. By this time, the victim, who was a long-time friend of appellant, and the appellant had become embroiled in an argument. At about 1:00 a. m., appellant got up from the bar to leave and walked toward the back of the barroom in the direction of the stairs which lead to his upstairs apartment. The victim shouted, “Nobody walks away from me when I'm talking,” and proceeded to follow appellant with his arms outstretched toward appellant. The victim had no weapons or objects in his hands. Although appellant testified that the victim grabbed him from behind around the neck and threatened to kill him, other eyewitnesses testified that they were unable to observe the victim's hands, either because of the witnesses' angle of observation or because the size of the victim (six feet one inch tall, weighing two hundred and ninety pounds) obscured their view of his hands. No witness other than appellant testified as to any physical contact between the victim and appellant immediately prior to the killing. Upon being accosted by the victim, appellant pulled a handgun from his right coat pocket and shot the victim twice, killing him. Appellant testified that because of robbery threats he carried the handgun at closing time.

Issue

Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not committed in self-defense?

The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing defense counsel's request to instruct the jury that where the defense of self-defense, 18 Pa.C.S.A. s 505 (1973), is raised by the evidence at trial, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not committed in self-defense.

Rule

When evidence at trial indicates the defense of self-defense, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense.

In Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645 (1975), this Court ruled that our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction must be conducted under the standard that when evidence at trial indicates the defense of self-defense, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense.

Analysis

The court found that the trial court's failure to provide specific instructions regarding the burden of proof on self-defense was erroneous. The jury was not adequately informed about the relationship between malice and self-defense, which is crucial in determining the outcome of a murder prosecution. The court emphasized that the jury must understand that a finding of malice requires the exclusion of self-defense.

The trial court's instructions to the jury were given prior to our decision in Cropper. Because defense counsel at trial correctly called to the court's attention the fact that Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974) (holding that where intoxication is a defense, prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not lack requisite intent), cast some doubt on the validity of instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving self-defense, the trial judge recognized this uncertainty and deliberately did not instruct the jury as to the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of sentence and ordered a new trial due to the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury on self-defense.

Accordingly, the judgment of sentence is reversed and a new trial is ordered.

Who won?

The appellant prevailed in the appeal because the Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense was a significant error that affected the trial's outcome.

Eagen, C. J., and O'Brien, J., concurred in the result.

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