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Keywords

defendantdamagesinjunctionmotiontrusteasementmotion to dismisssovereign immunity
contractplaintiffdefendantdamagesmotiontrusteasementmotion to dismisssovereign immunity

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Commissioner of New York State Department of Transportation v. Polite, — N.Y.S.3d —-, 2024 WL 4964811, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 06023

Facts

The State of New York alleged that the Trustee defendants, members of the Shinnecock Indian Nation, violated Highway Law by constructing billboards within a highway right-of-way on land owned by the tribe in fee simple without obtaining the necessary permits. The State had previously acquired a permanent easement for highway purposes over the land, and the defendants ignored multiple stop work orders issued by the Department of Transportation. The State sought an injunction to prevent further construction and to remove the existing structures.

The State, through the Department of Transportation (hereinafter the DOT), operates and maintains the highway. In or around 2019, the Trustee defendants allegedly entered into a contract with the defendants Larry Clark, Digital Outdoor Advertising, LLC, Idon Media, LLC, and/or Iconic Digital Displays, LLC, to construct and operate two structures, which the plaintiffs refer to as billboards and which the Trustee defendants refer to as monuments (hereinafter the structures), within the right-of-way for the highway in the State's easement.

Issue

Can officials of a Native American nation be sued in New York State courts for off-reservation violations of New York State law under a theory analogous to Ex parte Young?

In this case of first impression, we must determine under what circumstances, if any, officials of a sovereign Native American nation may be sued in New York State courts for their off-reservation actions, which allegedly were taken in their official capacities and which allegedly violate New York State law.

Rule

Native American nation officials may be sued in New York State courts for off-reservation violations of state law under a theory analogous to Ex parte Young, allowing for prospective injunctive relief, but tribal sovereign immunity bars claims for monetary damages.

Native American nation officials may be sued in New York State courts for off-reservation violations of New York State law under a theory analogous to Ex parte Young.

Analysis

The court applied the Ex parte Young doctrine, determining that the State's claims against the Trustee defendants were permissible because they involved ongoing violations of state law occurring off-reservation. The court found that the State had sufficiently alleged a continuing violation and that the defendants' actions were not protected by tribal sovereign immunity when seeking injunctive relief. However, the court recognized that the State could not seek monetary damages due to the immunity of the tribe.

Relying upon a theory analogous to the theory announced by the United States Supreme Court in (Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714), the plaintiffs contend that there is an exception to sovereign immunity that allows for actions against officials of Native American nations to enjoin ongoing violations of state law.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the denial of the Trustee defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint and the denial of the State's motion for a preliminary injunction, while modifying the decision to clarify that monetary claims were barred by tribal sovereign immunity.

The court should have granted those branches of the Trustee defendants’ motion which were to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as sought monetary damages, penalties, and interest insofar as asserted against them, but properly denied the remaining branches of the Trustee defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Who won?

The State of New York prevailed in establishing that it could sue the Trustee defendants for injunctive relief under state law, but it was limited in its ability to seek monetary damages due to tribal sovereign immunity.

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the Trustee defendants’ motion which were to dismiss so much of the first and second causes of action as sought monetary damages, penalties, and interest insofar as asserted against them, but properly denied the remaining branches of the Trustee defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them.

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