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Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485

Facts

On July 27, 1990, the decedent and two co-workers confronted the defendant, Lawrence Earl Cook, while searching for the decedent's wife. An argument ensued, leading to a physical altercation in which Cook stabbed the decedent in the chest. Cook claimed he did not intend to hurt the decedent, who later died from the stab wound. Cook was charged with intentional murder but was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by the jury.

The decedent and two co-workers were searching for the decedent's wife, when they saw appellant talking to the wife. The decedent confronted appellant and ordered appellant to leave. Appellant and decedent began to argue and shove each other. During the altercation, appellant stabbed the decedent in the chest with a knife.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the trial judge correctly refused to limit the definitions of the applicable culpable mental states to the result of the defendant's conduct?

We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial judge correctly refused appellant's request to limit the definitions of the applicable culpable mental states to the result of appellant's conduct.

Rule

In a prosecution for a 'result of conduct' offense, the culpable mental state must apply to the result of the conduct rather than the nature of the conduct.

This Court has further recognized that the scope of those culpable mental states is limited by the type of offense.

Analysis

The court determined that the trial judge's failure to limit the definitions of 'intentionally' and 'knowingly' to the result of the conduct constituted reversible error. The court emphasized that the definitions should focus on the result of the defendant's actions, as the offense of intentional murder is a 'result of conduct' offense. The court referenced previous cases that established this principle.

The Court of Appeals, relying on Kinnamon, held that 'under § 19.02(a)(1), the culpable mental states of knowingly or intentionally must be applied to both the conduct and the result of the conduct.'

Conclusion

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion that the trial judge erred in the jury charge.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Lawrence Earl Cook prevailed in the case because the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court erred in its jury charge regarding culpable mental states.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial judge erred in not limiting the culpable mental states to the result of appellant's conduct.

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