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Keywords

statutepatenttrademarkregulation
patentregulation

Related Cases

Cooper Technologies Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705

Facts

The patent owner, Cooper Technologies Company, challenged the interpretation of the term 'original application' by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) under the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA). The PTO had granted a request for inter partes reexamination of Cooper's patent, which was based on a continuation application filed after the AIPA's effective date. Cooper argued that the original application was the first in the chain, which was filed before the AIPA's enactment. The district court ruled in favor of the PTO, affirming its interpretation.

The Patent Office granted T & B's request for reexamination and issued an initial office action concluding that all thirty claims of the _791 patent were invalid. Cooper filed a petition with the Patent Office seeking to terminate the inter partes proceeding, arguing that the _791 patent did not issue from an original application filed after November 29, 1999.

Issue

Did the PTO have the authority to interpret what qualifies as an 'original application' under the AIPA, and was its interpretation entitled to deference?

Whether the Patent Office's interpretation of the term 'original application' in the American Inventors Protection Act is entitled to deference.

Rule

An administrative rule is 'substantive' when it effects a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations; in contrast, a rule which merely clarifies or explains existing law or regulations is 'interpretative.'

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the PTO's interpretation of 'original application' was reasonable and consistent with the statutory language of the AIPA. It concluded that the PTO's interpretation, which included continuation applications, was a permissible construction of the statute. The court noted that the term 'original application' does not have a single definitive meaning and can vary based on context. The PTO's interpretation was found to clarify the ambiguous statutory language rather than alter existing law.

The Patent Office's interpretation of 'original application' does not effect any change in existing law or policy; rather, it is a prospective clarification of ambiguous statutory language regarding a matter of procedure.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the PTO's interpretation of 'original application' was reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.

We conclude that the Patent Office's interpretation is reasonable and is entitled to Chevron deference.

Who won?

The prevailing party in this case was the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The court found that the PTO's interpretation of 'original application' was reasonable and consistent with the AIPA. The court emphasized that the PTO's authority to interpret its own regulations is well-established, and its interpretation was a clarification of ambiguous statutory language rather than a substantive change in law.

The Patent Office's interpretation of 'original application' available for inter partes reexamination under the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) was permissible, entitling it to deference under Chevron; Congress had not directly spoken on the issue, PTO expressly interpreted 'original application' as used in the AIPA, shortly after the AIPA was enacted.

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