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Keywords

plaintiffnegligenceliabilityappealwill
plaintiffdefendantnegligenceliabilitytrialpleamotionwill

Related Cases

Cowan v. Hospice Support Care, Inc., 268 Va. 482, 603 S.E.2d 916

Facts

Ingrid H. Cowan placed her mother, Ruth D. Hazelwood, in Harbor House, a facility operated by Hospice Support Care, Inc. During her stay, a volunteer mishandled the decedent, resulting in a shattered femur that required amputation. The decedent died four days later from complications. Cowan filed a wrongful death claim against Hospice, alleging various forms of negligence, but the circuit court dismissed the claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence based on charitable immunity.

On July 9, 2001, the plaintiff, Ingrid H. Cowan, placed her mother, Ruth D. Hazelwood (the decedent), in Harbor House, a residential facility that provides temporary care for very ill persons when their primary caregiver seeks respite.

Issue

Whether a plaintiff's claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence against a charity are barred by the doctrine of charitable immunity.

Whether a plaintiff's claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence against a charity are barred by the doctrine of charitable immunity.

Rule

The public policy rationale that shields a charity from liability for acts of simple negligence does not extend to acts of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence.

the public policy rationale that shields a charity from liability for acts of simple negligence does not extend to acts of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence.

Analysis

The court analyzed the distinctions between simple negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton negligence, concluding that the latter two represent a marked departure from the routine performance of a charity's activities. The court emphasized that while simple negligence may occur in the course of a charity's operations, gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence involve conduct that shocks fair-minded people and cannot be seen as an attempt to fulfill the charity's mission.

Thus, unlike simple negligence, these two levels of negligence are characterized by conduct that represents an unusual and marked departure from the routine performance of a charity's activities.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the charitable immunity doctrine does not apply to claims of gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

We conclude that the circuit court erred in sustaining the defendant's plea of charitable immunity to Counts II and III of Cowan's amended motion for judgment.

Who won?

Ingrid H. Cowan prevailed in the appeal because the Supreme Court found that the charitable immunity doctrine did not protect Hospice from liability for gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence.

Cowan did not assign error to the trial court's decision sustaining the demurrer to the negligent hiring and retention claim.

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