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Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460

Facts

Bradley Kelton Crenshaw was stopped by Officer Andrew Anderson for changing lanes without signaling and weaving onto the shoulder of the road. The officer detected alcohol on Crenshaw's breath and observed signs of intoxication, leading to his arrest for DWI. At trial, the jury was instructed on both subjective and per se definitions of intoxication, despite the information only alleging the subjective definition. The jury found Crenshaw guilty, and he was sentenced to 120 days' confinement and a fine.

At trial, Officer Andrew Anderson testified that he stopped Appellant around 2:00 a.m. after witnessing him changing lanes without signaling and weaving onto the shoulder of the road as he exited the highway. The officer smelled alcohol on Appellant's breath, and he noticed that Appellant had heavy, red, bloodshot eyes and soft, slurred speech.

Issue

Did the trial court err by including both the subjective and per se definitions of intoxication in the jury charge when the information only alleged the subjective definition?

Can submission of a jury charge with an application paragraph that tracks the information's language verbatim erroneously expand on the allegations of the information, constituting charging error?

Rule

The court held that jury instructions do not expand the allegations a defendant faces when the application paragraph submitted tracks the indictment's language verbatim.

Noting that the application paragraph mirrored the information's allegations, the State contends that this Court has routinely held that jury instructions do not expand the allegations a defendant faces when the application paragraph submitted tracks the indictment's language verbatim.

Analysis

The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the jury charge was proper because the application paragraph mirrored the information's allegations, which only included the subjective definition of intoxication. The inclusion of the per se definition in the abstract section did not authorize a conviction based on that definition, as the application paragraph restricted the jury's consideration to the allegations contained in the information.

The per se definition of intoxication was only in the abstract section of the jury charge, and it was not incorporated into the application paragraph. The application paragraph tracked the language of the information, which alleged the subjective theory of intoxication, and thus restricted the jury's consideration to only those allegations contained in the information.

Conclusion

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the inclusion of the per se definition did not expand the allegations against Crenshaw.

Appellant was convicted under the subjective theory of intoxication as alleged in the information. Including the per se definition of intoxication in the abstract portion of the jury charge did not expand the allegations against Appellant.

Who won?

The State prevailed in the case because the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the jury charge did not constitute harmful error and that the defendant was convicted under the subjective theory of intoxication as alleged in the information.

The State is bound by the allegations in the charging instrument. Leal v. State, 975 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998); Doyle v. State, 661 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

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