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Keywords

contractplaintiffdefendantdamagesstatuteinjunctionwillpatentsustained
plaintiffdefendantdamagesinjunctionmotionwillsustainedmotion to dismiss

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Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal.2d 321, 282 P.2d 33

Facts

On October 17, 1950, the plaintiff and defendants allegedly entered into an oral agreement granting the plaintiff exclusive rights to purchase certain patented shower heads. The plaintiff later filed a complaint claiming breach of this agreement, but the court sustained a demurrer on the grounds that the written memorandum provided did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. After the dismissal of the first action, the plaintiff filed a new complaint in 1953, claiming an exclusive sales agreement and seeking an injunction and damages, but the court found this action to be identical to the first and dismissed it.

On November 12, 1953, plaintiff brought the present action seeking an injunction, an accounting, and damages. The complaint alleges that ‘On or about October 17, 1950, at Los Angeles County California, plaintiffs and defendants made and entered into an exclusive sales agreement, and on said date defendants made, signed and delivered to plaintiffs their written memorandum of said agreement…’

Issue

Whether the new complaint alleging an exclusive sales agreement was barred by res judicata due to the prior judgment dismissing a similar action.

Whether the new complaint alleging an exclusive sales agreement was barred by res judicata due to the prior judgment dismissing a similar action.

Rule

A judgment entered after a general demurrer has been sustained is a judgment on the merits and will bar a subsequent action alleging the same facts, even if different facts are alleged in the second action.

A judgment entered after a general demurrer has been sustained is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will, accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts.

Analysis

The court analyzed the records of both actions and determined that the facts alleged in the new complaint were substantially the same as those in the first action. The court noted that the plaintiff's claim of a written contract was not supported by the language of the complaint, which referred to a 'written memorandum' rather than a formal written contract. Since the same document was relied upon in both actions, the court concluded that the prior judgment was a complete bar to the current action.

A comparison of the records in the two actions reveals that the facts alleged in the present action are substantially the same as those adjudicated in the first action and that the case therefore falls squarely within the first rule in the Keidatz case.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action, ruling that it was barred by the prior judgment and was also deemed sham and frivolous.

The judgment is affirmed.

Who won?

Defendants prevailed in the case because the court found that the plaintiff's new complaint was barred by res judicata and did not sufficiently allege a written contract.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the record in the first action offered in support of the motion was received in evidence. The motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds that the alleged agreement is identical with that alleged in the first action, that the prior judgment is res judicata, and that the action is sham and frivolous.

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