Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

lawsuitsettlementdefendantstatuteappealtrialsummary judgmentmalpracticestatute of limitationssustained
attorneystatuteappealtrialsummary judgmentmalpracticestatute of limitationsappellant

Related Cases

Detenbeck v. Koester, 886 S.W.2d 477
View Case »
Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game, 159 Idaho 125, 357 P.3d 850
View Case »
Herr v. Wheeler, 272 Va. 310, 634 S.E.2d 317
View Case »
Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hospital, 32 Wis.2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166
View Case »
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 55 USLW 5092
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Crumpton v. Humana, Inc., 99 N.M. 562, 661 P.2d 54, 1983 -NMSC- 034

Facts

Wanda Crumpton underwent surgery at Llano Estacado Medical Center on February 8, 1979. She claimed to have sustained injuries to her neck and legs when a nurse attempted to lower her hospital bed on February 11, 1979. Crumpton filed her lawsuit on February 15, 1982, more than three years after the incident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Crumpton offers no evidence to contradict the fact that the alleged negligent act and injury occurred simultaneously on February 11, 1979.

Issue

Did the three-year statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice suit bar Crumpton's claim, and was the statute tolled during settlement negotiations?

Crumpton argues that her injury was not ascertainable until some time after the accident occurred. Further, she contends that the statute of limitations should have been tolled during the time the parties were negotiating.

Rule

The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims begins to run from the date of the injury or the date of the alleged malpractice, and it is not tolled during settlement negotiations.

Under both the Medical Malpractice Act, Section 41–5–13, and the general three-year statute of limitations, Section 37–1–8, Crumpton's suit is barred.

Analysis

The court determined that Crumpton's injury was ascertainable on February 11, 1979, the date of the incident, despite her claims of ongoing treatment. The court found no merit in her argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled during settlement negotiations, as there was no evidence of fraudulent inducement by the defendants.

In our view, the fact that she had continuing treatments and hospitalizations after the injury does not necessarily make the date of the injury unascertainable.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Crumpton's suit was barred by the statute of limitations and that the appeal was frivolous.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment against Crumpton. Because we determine this appeal to be frivolous and entirely without merit, costs and attorneys fees are to be borne by appellants.

Who won?

Defendants prevailed in the case because the court found that Crumpton's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, which began to run on the date of her injury.

We also note that there is a strong indication in the record that counsel for the appellant ineptly and perhaps negligently handled his client's case.

You must be