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Keywords

statuteappealhabeas corpusstatute of limitationslegal counsel
statuteappealhabeas corpuswillstatute of limitations

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Dew v. Clarke, 242 F.3d 381, 2000 WL 1545500 (Table)

Facts

David Dew filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted prior to the enactment of AEDPA. He waited 362 days after AEDPA's enactment to file his state appeal and only sought legal counsel three days before the statute of limitations expired. Dew argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling due to his pro se representation and the time spent preparing his claims in state court.

The record indicates that the reason Dew had only three days to file in federal court following his state exhaustion was because he had waited until 362 days after the enactment of AEDPA to file his state appeal.

Issue

Did the district court err in denying Dew's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely and in refusing to grant equitable tolling?

Did the district court err in denying Dew's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely and in refusing to grant equitable tolling?

Rule

Equitable tolling is available only if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and statutory tolling under AEDPA applies only from the time a state habeas petition is properly filed.

Equitable tolling will only be available “if ‘extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Analysis

The court determined that Dew's circumstances did not constitute 'extraordinary circumstances' as he had waited nearly a year to file his state appeal and his pro se status did not justify tolling. Furthermore, the court clarified that the holding in Nino v. Galaza regarding statutory tolling did not apply to the time prior to filing a state habeas petition.

The court determined that Dew's circumstances do not rise to the level of “extraordinary circumstances … beyond his control.”

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Dew's habeas petition as untimely, concluding that Dew failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or a valid claim of actual innocence.

Therefore, we decline to decide in this case the issue of whether there is an ‘actual innocence’ exception to AEDPA's statute of limitations.

Who won?

The United States District Court prevailed in the case, as it upheld the dismissal of Dew's petition based on the untimeliness and lack of extraordinary circumstances.

The court found that Dew's decision to proceed pro se in his state appeal is not an “extraordinary circumstance beyond [his] control.”

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