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Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr

Facts

Fernando Diaz-Quirazco, a native and citizen of Mexico, was convicted of contempt of court for violating a restraining order obtained by his partner, Georgina Martinez-Gonzalez, under Oregon's Family Abuse Prevention Act. The restraining order prohibited him from contacting her, but he violated this order, leading to his arrest and subsequent conviction. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to this conviction.

Diaz-Quirazco claims he entered the United States without inspection in 1997. Diaz-Quirazco and Georgina Martinez-Gonzalez have a child together, who was born in Oregon in September 2003. On July 20, 2010, Martinez-Gonzalez filed a Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse under the Family Abuse Prevention Act ('FAPA'), Or. Rev. Stat. ('ORS') 107.700-107.735 (2009). In the petition, Martinez-Gonzalez stated, through an interpreter, that she feared imminent abuse by Diaz-Quirazco and that Diaz-Quirazco had forced himself into her home, forced her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, threatened her with a kitchen knife, physically and verbally abused her in front of their child, and threatened to harm their child.

Issue

Whether the BIA's interpretation that the categorical approach does not apply to determining whether an alien's violation of a protection order renders him convicted of an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) is entitled to Chevron deference.

This case presents two issues. First, whether we should accord deference to the BIA's interpretation that 1229b(b)(1)(C) does not require analysis under the categorical approach for determining whether an alien's violation of a protection order renders him convicted of an offense under 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), as articulated in the BIA's published opinion of Medina-Jimenez. Second, whether to defer to the BIA's interpretation that 1101(a)(48)(A) does not require that the underlying offense be labeled a crime as long as the proceeding was 'criminal in nature.'

Rule

The court applied the Chevron deference standard to the BIA's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, concluding that the BIA's articulation regarding the categorical approach and the definition of 'conviction' under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A) was reasonable.

We follow the Chevron framework, 'if the [BIA's] decision is a published decision (or an unpublished decision directly controlled by a published decision interpreting the same statute).' Id.; see also Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that Chevron deference applies where 'there is 'binding agency precedent on-point' in the form of a published BIA opinion' (quoting Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008))).

Analysis

The court found that the BIA's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron. It determined that the categorical approach was not applicable in this case and that the nature of the proceedings, which included constitutional safeguards, sufficed to classify Diaz-Quirazco's conviction as a 'conviction' under the INA. The court agreed with the BIA's conclusion that Diaz-Quirazco's violation of the restraining order constituted an offense under the relevant immigration statutes.

The court found that the BIA's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron. It determined that the categorical approach was not applicable in this case and that the nature of the proceedings, which included constitutional safeguards, sufficed to classify Diaz-Quirazco's conviction as a 'conviction' under the INA. The court agreed with the BIA's conclusion that Diaz-Quirazco's violation of the restraining order constituted an offense under the relevant immigration statutes.

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit denied Diaz-Quirazco's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his conviction for violating a protection order.

We deny Diaz-Quirazco's petition. We conclude that the BIA's articulation in Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 399 (BIA 2018), and Matter of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), that the categorical approach does not apply to determining whether an alien's violation of a protection order under 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) renders him convicted of an offense under 1229b(b)(1)(C), is entitled to Chevron deference.

Who won?

The government prevailed in this case as the court upheld the BIA's decision, affirming that Diaz-Quirazco's conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The government prevailed in this case as the court upheld the BIA's decision, affirming that Diaz-Quirazco's conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

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