Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

statutepleamotionleasefelonybaildeportationrespondentguilty plea

attorneyappealpleamotionleasefelonymisdemeanordeportationgood faithliens

Related Cases

Diaz v. McElroy

Facts

Petitioner Mario Abreu Diaz, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1967. He has a lengthy criminal history, including a felony conviction for burglary in 1997. Following his release from prison, the INS began removal proceedings against him, and he was ordered removed after conceding his deportability. Diaz challenged the removal order and his continued detention without bail, claiming he should be allowed to seek a discretionary waiver under former 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Diaz is a thirty-nine year old citizen of the Dominican Republic. He was admitted to the United States in June 1967 as a lawful permanent resident. He has a lengthy criminal history which includes a felony conviction in December 1980 for robbery in the second degree, eight misdemeanor convictions over the course of seventeen years, and, most recently, a May 22, 1997 conviction upon a plea of guilty on May 5, 1997 to burglary in the third degree, for which he was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment.

Issue

Whether Diaz can challenge the retroactive application of the statutory bars to discretionary relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.

The pivotal issue in this case, then, is whether Diaz is able to challenge the application of AEDPA 440(d) or IIRIRA 304 to him as impermissibly retroactive.

Rule

The court applied the principle that a petitioner may challenge the retroactive application of statutory bars if immigration proceedings commenced before the enactment of those statutes, and that the controlling date for determining the applicability of such bars is the date of the guilty plea.

The former INA 212(c) allowed for a discretionary waiver by the Attorney General of deportation for convicted aliens who could prove that they have lived in the United States continuously for at least 7 years, and have not been convicted of one or more 'aggravated felonies.'

Analysis

The court found that Diaz pled guilty after the enactment of both AEDPA and IIRIRA, which meant that the application of the bars eliminating discretionary relief to him could not be deemed impermissibly retroactive. Consequently, the court held that Diaz was statutorily ineligible to apply for discretionary relief from deportation.

In the instant case, Diaz pled guilty on May 5, 1997, after the enactment of both AEDPA in April 1996 and IIRIRA's permanent rules in April 1997. Consequently, the application of the bars eliminating discretionary relief to Diaz cannot be deemed impermissibly retroactive and their operation divests this Court of authority to consider any claims for relief under former INA 212(c).

Conclusion

The court denied Diaz's challenge to his removal order and dismissed his challenge to continued detention without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. His motion for health-related release was also denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's challenge to his removal order is DENIED. His motion for health-related release is also DENIED.

Who won?

The respondent, McElroy, prevailed in the case as the court upheld the removal order and dismissed Diaz's challenges.

The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith.

You must be

Log In to Casey

Sign Up to Casey

Reset Your Password

Keywords

Related Cases

Azurin, Matter of

Parrilla v. Gonzales

Barnaby v. Reno

Ayala-Gomez; U.S. v.

Sandoval-Barajas; U.S. v.