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Keywords

negligencestatutesummary judgmentmalpracticestatute of limitations
negligencestatutesummary judgmentmalpracticestatute of limitations

Related Cases

Dickey v. Vermette, 960 A.2d 1178, 2008 ME 179

Facts

From 2000 to 2005, Maetta Dickey was a regular patient of dentist Gerald E. Vermette. During this time, a dark spot was noted on an x-ray of her teeth, but no serious concerns were communicated to her. In March 2005, after the spot had grown, she was diagnosed with oral cancer and underwent extensive surgery. The Dickeys filed a notice of claim against Vermette on February 23, 2006, alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium, but Vermette moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that claims based on acts before February 23, 2003, were barred by the statute of limitations.

From 2000 to 2005, Maetta Dickey was a regular patient of Gerald E. Vermette, D.D.S. In March 2000, a dental hygienist at the practice noticed a dark spot on an x-ray taken of Dickey's teeth. The hygienist noted that the spot was odd but did not express any serious concerns to Dickey.

Issue

Whether the continuing course of treatment doctrine can be applied to toll the statute of limitations for the Dickeys' medical malpractice claims against Dr. Vermette.

Whether the continuing course of treatment doctrine can be applied to toll the statute of limitations for the Dickeys' medical malpractice claims against Dr. Vermette.

Rule

Under 24 M.R.S. § 2902, actions for professional negligence must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, which occurs on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury.

Actions for professional negligence shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues. For the purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury….

Analysis

The court determined that the continuing treatment doctrine was inconsistent with the statute of limitations outlined in 24 M.R.S. § 2902. It noted that allowing the Dickeys to bring claims for acts or omissions that occurred before February 23, 2003, simply because their relationship with Vermette continued until 2005, would impose a judicially-created exception contrary to the statute's plain meaning. The court emphasized that the Dickeys had stipulated that no act or omission occurring after February 23, 2003, was a proximate cause of their injuries, which further supported the ruling.

By allowing the Dickeys to bring claims for acts or omissions that occurred before February 23, 2003, simply because Maetta Dickey did not end her relationship with Vermette until March 2005, we would be imposing a judicially-created exception that is contrary to the plain meaning of section 2902.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Dickeys' claims arising from acts or omissions that occurred before February 23, 2003.

Therefore, we agree with the Superior Court that the statute of limitations in section 2902 bars the Dickeys' claims arising from acts or omissions that occurred before February 23, 2003, and affirm the judgment granting partial summary judgment to Vermette.

Who won?

Gerald E. Vermette prevailed in the case because the court upheld the application of the statute of limitations, ruling that the Dickeys' claims were barred due to the timing of the alleged negligent acts.

Gerald E. Vermette prevailed in the case because the court upheld the application of the statute of limitations, ruling that the Dickeys' claims were barred due to the timing of the alleged negligent acts.

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