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Keywords

lawsuitdue processvisajudicial review

precedentdue processvisawrit of mandamusdeclaratory judgment

Related Cases

Din v. Kerry

Facts

Fauzia Din, a naturalized U.S. citizen, sought to have her husband, Kanishka Berashk, an Afghan citizen and former civil servant in the Taliban regime, granted a visa to enter the United States. After the U.S. government denied Berashk's visa application under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B) for terrorist activities, Din filed a lawsuit claiming that the denial violated her constitutional rights, specifically her right to due process. The District Court dismissed her case, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, asserting that Din had a protected liberty interest in her marriage.

Din then brought suit in Federal District Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the United States to properly adjudicate Berashks visa application; a declaratory judgment that 8 U.S.C. q82(b)(2)-(3), which exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found inadmissible under the terrorism bar, is unconstitutional as applied; and a declaratory judgment that the denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

Issue

Does a naturalized U.S. citizen have a protected liberty interest in her marriage that allows her to seek judicial review of a consular officer's decision denying her spouse's visa application?

Does a naturalized U.S. citizen have a protected liberty interest in her marriage that allows her to challenge the denial of her husband's visa application?

Rule

The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects individuals from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. However, the Court has historically interpreted this to mean that no process is due if one is not deprived of these interests.

The Fifth Amendment provides that '[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' Although the amount and quality of process that our precedents have recognized as 'due' under the Clause has changed considerably since the founding, it remains the case that no process is due if one is not deprived of 'life, liberty, or property.'

Analysis

The Court analyzed whether the denial of Berashk's visa application deprived Din of any constitutionally protected interests. It concluded that the denial did not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property for Din, as the government had not restricted her freedom of movement or confined her in any way. The Court emphasized that the denial of her husband's visa did not equate to a deprivation of her own rights under the Due Process Clause.

The first question that we must ask, then, is whether the denial of Berashks visa application deprived Din of any of these interests. Only if we answer in the affirmative must we proceed to consider whether the Governments explanation afforded sufficient process.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, ruling that Din did not have a protected liberty interest in her marriage that would allow her to challenge the visa denial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

For the reasons given in this opinion and in the opinion concurring in the judgment, we vacate and remand.

Who won?

The U.S. government prevailed in the case, as the Supreme Court found that Din did not possess a protected liberty interest in her marriage that would allow her to contest the visa denial.

The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case.

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