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Keywords

appealtrial
statuteappealtrialobjectionwrit of certiorari

Related Cases

Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 772 A.2d 283

Facts

On December 12, 1997, Thomas Dalton Dixon was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, first degree assault, and the use of a handgun in a crime of violence. He was sentenced to twenty years for first degree assault, ten years for attempted voluntary manslaughter (to be served concurrently), and twenty years for the handgun charge (to be served consecutively). After the Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, Dixon was retried and again convicted of first degree assault and the handgun charge, but the attempted voluntary manslaughter charge was nol prossed. The trial judge imposed a twenty-year sentence for first degree assault and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the handgun charge.

On 12 December 1997, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, a jury convicted Thomas Dalton Dixon, Petitioner, of attempted voluntary manslaughter, first degree assault, and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

Issue

Was Petitioner illegally sentenced to twenty years for first degree assault where in a prior trial he was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and first degree assault and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and twenty years, respectively?

Was Petitioner illegally sentenced to twenty years for first degree assault where in a prior trial he was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and first degree assault and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and twenty years, respectively, and the Court of Special Appeals, upon reversing the convictions, concluded for the trial court's guidance on remand that first degree assault should have merged into attempted voluntary manslaughter, and on retrial the State was allowed, over objection, to nol pros the attempted voluntary manslaughter charge?

Rule

First degree assault, when committed under the modality of intentionally causing or attempting to cause serious physical injury to another, is a lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. However, first degree assault, when committed with a firearm, is not a lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

First degree assault is a relatively new statutory crime which only took effect on October 1, 1996, and the question of whether it would merge into a manslaughter conviction is a matter of first impression.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the first degree assault conviction should merge into the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. It concluded that the first degree assault conviction based on the intent to cause serious physical injury merged into the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, while the conviction based on the use of a firearm did not. The court determined that the sentence for first degree assault was illegal because it exceeded the lawful sentence that should have been imposed based on the merger of the offenses.

The Court of Special Appeals concluded, however, that it was unable to make this latter determination as the record was ambiguous. The intermediate appellate court noted that the Circuit Court instructed the jury that it could convict Petitioner of first degree assault under either modality, (a)(1) or (a)(2), of the first degree assault statute.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded the case with directions, concluding that the sentence for first degree assault was illegal.

Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed; case remanded to the Court of Special Appeals with directions.

Who won?

Thomas Dalton Dixon prevailed in the case as the Court of Appeals found that his sentence for first degree assault was illegal, thus requiring a remand for proper sentencing.

We granted Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, Dixon v. State, 361 Md. 433, 761 A.2d 932 (2000), to consider the following question:

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