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Keywords

tortplaintiffdefendantnegligencestatutemotionsustainedcomparative negligence
plaintiffdefendantnegligencestatutemotionmalpracticesustainedcomparative negligence

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Doran v. Priddy, 534 F.Supp. 30, 10 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 173

Facts

The case arose from the birth of Chip Doran, who suffered injuries allegedly due to the negligence of Dr. Priddy, the attending physician. The plaintiffs claimed that Dr. Priddy’s absence during a critical time led to complications that resulted in Chip's injuries. The defense argued that other parties, including the parents and other medical professionals, contributed to the injuries. The court examined the actions of Dr. Priddy and others involved in Chip's birth, including the failure of Dr. Labhsetwar to intervene when Dr. Priddy was unavailable.

This is a diversity action alleging the medical negligence of defendant between the dates of October 12 and October 15, 1977, inclusive, which caused permanent brain damage and other injuries to Raymond James Doran, V, or Chip, the minor plaintiff.

Issue

The main legal issues included whether Dr. Labhsetwar had a duty to act in the absence of Dr. Priddy, whether Kansas comparative negligence law required a comparison of all negligence, and the constitutionality of the Kansas collateral source statute.

The District Court, Theis, J., held that: (1) obstetrician who was at hospital during treating physician's absence was not shown to have had a duty to act; (2) Kansas comparative negligence law did not require a comparison of any and all negligence, such as uncharged negligence of pediatrician in failing to report suspected child abuse after one year following birth; and (3) Kansas collateral source statute, which permits certain evidence of reimbursement or indemnification in a malpractice suit, violates the State and Federal Constitutions.

Rule

The court applied the principles of Kansas comparative negligence law, which does not require the comparison of all potential negligence, and examined the constitutional implications of the Kansas collateral source statute.

To compare the negligence of either of these doctors, if any there be, as contended by Dr. Priddy, would require the Court to create new causes of action under Kansas law.

Analysis

The court determined that Dr. Labhsetwar had no duty to act as there was no doctor-patient relationship, and thus her alleged negligence could not be compared to that of Dr. Priddy. The court also clarified that the Kansas comparative negligence statute focuses on the causal negligence of tortfeasors, and that the collateral source statute's provisions were unconstitutional as they discriminated against certain classes of plaintiffs.

Under the facts of this case, Dr. Labhsetwar was under no duty to act, and there is no negligence to compare.

Conclusion

The court denied the defendant's motion for review and sustained the plaintiffs' motion in limine, ultimately ruling that the Kansas collateral source statute was unconstitutional.

Motion for review denied; motion in limine sustained.

Who won?

The plaintiffs prevailed in the case, as the court found in their favor regarding the constitutionality of the collateral source statute and the lack of duty on the part of Dr. Labhsetwar.

The court's final decision or holding in 1–2 sentences.

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