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Keywords

statutediscriminationcivil rightshuman rightscommon lawstatutory lawlegislative intent

statutewillcivil rightshuman rightscommon lawstatutory law

Related Cases

Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441, 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 281, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,030, 13 IER Cases 740

Facts

Laura L. Doss was hired by Jamco, Inc. and informed her supervisors about her pregnancy before starting work. Shortly after her employment began, she was terminated because her maternity leave would coincide with the company's busy period. Doss filed a complaint alleging unlawful termination based on her sex and pregnancy, invoking the Virginia Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

[Doss] was hired by [Jamco] and agreed to begin work on March 11, 1996…. [P]rior to reporting to work for [Jamco] on March 11, 1996, [Doss] learned that she was pregnant. Upon reporting for work, [Doss] told [Jamco's] employees who were to be her supervisors about her pregnancy…. [O]n March 12, 1996, [Jamco's] supervisors informed [Doss] that her employment was being terminated because her maternity leave would cause her to be out during the Company's busy time which was unacceptable to [Jamco].

Issue

Does Va.Code § 2.1–725(D) prohibit a common law cause of action based upon the public policies reflected in the Virginia Human Rights Act?

Rule

The Virginia Human Rights Act, specifically Va.Code § 2.1–725(D), states that causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in the Act shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures, and remedies afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances.

Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the Virginia Human Rights Act and its amendments, determining that the General Assembly intended to limit causes of action for unlawful termination to those specified in the Act and related statutes. The court found that the amendments made in 1995 clearly indicated a legislative intent to abrogate common law claims related to employment discrimination, thereby affirming that Doss's claim could not proceed under common law.

In our opinion, in amending the Act by adding subsection D to Va.Code § 2.1–725 in 1995, the General Assembly plainly manifested its intention to alter the common law rule with respect to '[c]auses of action based upon the public policies reflected in [the Act].'

Conclusion

The court answered the certified question in the affirmative, concluding that the Virginia Human Rights Act prohibits a common law cause of action based on its public policies.

Finding that, in enacting the 1995 amendments to Va.Code § 2.1–725, the General Assembly plainly manifested an intent to abrogate the common law with respect to causes of action for unlawful termination of employment based upon the public policies reflected in the Act, we will answer the certified question in the affirmative.

Who won?

Jamco, Inc. prevailed in the case because the court held that the Virginia Human Rights Act limited the available causes of action to those provided by statutory law, thus barring Doss's common law claim.

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